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Protecting a Right to Access Internet 
Content 
THE FEASIBILITY OF JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT IN 
A NON-NEUTRAL NETWORK 
INTRODUCTION 
If information is a weapon for change, then the Internet 
arms every man, woman, and child on the planet. Now more 
than ever, the disruptive power of viral mass-communication is 
palpable.  
The spread of information networks is forming a new nervous 
system for our planet. When something happens in Haiti or Hunan, 
the rest of us learn about it in real time—from real people. And we 
can respond in real time as well. . . . As we sit here, any of you—or 
maybe more likely, any of our children—can take out the tools that 
many carry every day and transmit this discussion to billions across 
the world.1 
This cosmopolitan nervous system manifested itself in 
early 2011, when the Egyptian citizenry used Facebook to 
organize thousands in Tahrir Square to engage in 
antigovernment protest.2 As a defensive measure, the Egyptian 
government took the rare and startling step of “switching off” 
Internet connectivity for its eighty million residents.3 
Concurrently, embassy cables disclosed on WikiLeaks 
exasperated the uprising in Tunisia when the population 
  
 1 Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on Internet Freedom 
(Jan. 21, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/ 
135519.htm). 
 2 Catherine Smith, Egypt’s Facebook Revolution, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 11, 
2011, 3:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/egypt-facebook-revolution-
wael-ghonim_n_822078.html; Ben Wedeman & Amir Ahmed, 3 Dead After Thousand 
Protest in Rare Egypt Outpouring, CNN (Jan. 26, 2011, 3:33 AM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2011/WORLD/africa/01/25/egypt.protests/index.html.  
 3 Kyle VanHemert, How Egypt Turned Off the Internet, GIZMODO (Jan. 28, 
2011, 3:14 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5746121/how-egypt-turned-off-the-internet.  
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discovered the “mafia-esque” corruption that yielded “massive 
profits” for the nation’s government elite.4  
Reliance on Internet connectivity obviously extends well 
beyond national protest; reliance presents itself several times 
over in varying facets of everyday life, especially in the 
nascence of ubiquitous computing. Over a quarter of the 
world’s population accesses the Internet.5  
Unsurprisingly, an international sentiment has 
emerged clearly indicating that Internet access is desired by 
all.6 And of course, the public’s sentiment is not powerless: in 
June 2009, France’s Constitutional Council denied President 
Sarkozy’s power to create an Internet police force and ruled 
that Internet access is a basic human right.7 The Council 
opined, “In the current state of the means of communication 
and given the generalized development of public online 
communication services and the importance of the latter for the 
participation in democracy and the expression of ideas and 
opinions, this right implies freedom to access such services.”8 In 
recent history, the United Nations has warned the 
  
 4 Elizabeth Dickinson, The First WikiLeaks Revolution?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 
13, 2011, 6:17 PM), http://wikileaks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/13/wikileaks_and_the_ 
tunisia_protests.  
 5 Internet Usage Statistics: The Internet Big Picture, INTERNET WORLD 
STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited July 25, 2011). For 
comparison, there were just over 360 million Internet users by December 31, 2000. Id. 
  The FCC reports that, in 2009, eighty percent of home broadband users 
accessed the Internet to retrieve local news, fifty-five percent accessed a social 
networking site, and forty-eight percent uploaded content. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, 
BROADBAND PERFORMANCE PAPER: OBI TECHNICAL PAPER NO. 4, at 8 exh. 7 (2010), 
available at http://download.broadband.gov/plan/fcc-omnibus-broadband-initiative-
%28obi%29-technical-paper-broadband-performance.pdf.  
 6 The BBC took a poll indicating that four in five people worldwide consider 
Internet access a “fundamental right.” BBC NEWS, Internet Access Is ‘a Fundamental 
Right’ (Mar. 8, 2010, 8:52 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8548190.stm. The desire to 
make the Internet a fundamental right for all appears even more prominent in 
countries with less experience with Internet and less Internet diffusion. WORLD ECON. 
FORUM, THE NEW INTERNET WORLD: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION, PRIVACY, TRUST AND SECURITY ONLINE 9 (2011), available at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GITR_TheNewInternetWorld_Report_2011.pdf. 
 7 Charles Bremner, Top French Court Rips Heart Out of Sarkozy Internet Law, 
TIMES (London) (June 11, 2009), http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/ 
article6478542.ece. 
 8 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-580DC, 
June 10, 2009, Rec. 107 (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/ 
decision//2009/decisions-par-date/2009/2009-580-dc/decision-n-2009-580-dc-du-10-juin-
2009.42666.html (click “Version en anglais” in right sidebar for an English version).  
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international community that cutting off Internet access to 
quell protest is a human rights violation.9  
While some members of the U.S. Supreme Court may be 
unwilling to recognize the weight international trends—even 
mandates—should have on U.S. lawmaking,10 U.S. citizens must 
begin to consider when a central function to daily living becomes 
something fundamental or guaranteed. Indeed, Americans 
consider the Internet as (if not more) important to their lives as 
the rest of the world. In 2009, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) reported that the average American household 
user consumed over nine gigabytes of data per month.11 The 
number of Americans demanding high-speed Internet access 
appears to be accelerating very rapidly as well.12 In the wake of 
U.S. economic turmoil, Congress mandated the implementation of 
an initiative to make broadband services more accessible to 
Americans.13 Perhaps an indicator of increased broadband use, 
Facebook (an American-born company) has seen its membership 
base grow exponentially.14  
Beyond use as a forum for expression and a database for 
information, the Internet has become home to increasingly 
varied application across the spectrum of telecommunication. 
The Internet protocol (IP) suite is now used for phone services 
  
 9 David Kravets, U.N. Report Declares Internet Access a Human Right, 
WIRED (June 3, 2011, 2:47 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/06/internet-a-
human-right/. 
 10 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Constitutional entitlements do not spring into existence because some States choose 
to lessen or eliminate criminal sanctions on certain behavior. Much less do they spring 
into existence, as the Court seems to believe, because foreign nations decriminalize 
conduct.”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622-28 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority’s use of international law and trend to reach its decision).  
 11 FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 5, at 4. 
 12 Edward B. Mulligan, Note, Derailed by the D.C. Circuit: Getting Network 
Management Regulation Back on Track, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 633, 637 (2010) (citing 
Table 1121: Adult Computer and Adult Internet Users by Selected Characteristics: 2000 
to 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/compendia/ 
statab/2010/tables/10s1121.pdf).  
 13 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, div. B, tit. VI, 
§ 6001(k)(2), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (“The national broadband plan required 
by this section shall seek to ensure that all people of the United States have access to 
broadband capability and shall establish benchmarks for meeting that goal.”). For more 
information on the National Broadband Plan, see National Broadband Plan: 
Connecting America, BROADBAND.GOV, http://www.broadband.gov/plan/ (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2011).  
 14 In July 2011, Facebook clocked 750 million registered users, skyrocketing from 
500 million users only a year prior. Leena Rao, Zuck Confirms that Facebook Now Has 750 
Million Active Users, TECHCRUNCH (July 6, 2011, 1:32 PM), http://techcrunch.com/2011/ 
07/06/zuck-confirms-that-facebook-now-has-750-million-users/. 
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through Voice-Over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technology,15 IP 
television is quickly gaining its footing in the viewership 
market,16 and the demand for mobile broadband has greatly 
increased with the advent of smartphones, netbooks, tablets, 
and other ubiquitous computing devices.17  
One need not be terribly tech-savvy to conclude that 
much of humanity now relies upon Internet connectivity to 
retrieve and deliver content. The question emerges: ought the 
United States follow the worldwide trend to afford its citizens a 
right to access the lawful Internet content of their choice? 
Reserving for others the question of whether such a right 
should be fundamental under U.S. law, the most appropriate 
placeholder for a right to access Internet content, at least prima 
facie, is the First Amendment—the Internet is fundamentally a 
form of communication, after all.18 Theorists, scholars, and the 
citizenship-at-large must inquire, however, what the contours of 
such a recognized right would be, and—more importantly—how 
it can be preserved. The foundation of the latter inquiry goes 
beyond consumer-centered questions—how the government can 
deploy common carriage in the Internet age or how state actors 
can ensure that Internet service providers (ISPs) adhere to their 
terms of service. It lies in the more fundamental (and essential) 
question of how individuals can be assured access to the content 
of their choice when their ISPs and government have failed to 
account for that interest.  
This fundamental question could not be riper for 
discussion. Current law and market realities do not easily 
accommodate a right or guarantee of access to Internet content. 
  
 15 See Voice-Over-Internet Protocol, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, http://www.fcc.gov/ 
voip/ (last visited July 25, 2011). 
 16 Chris Davies, Smart TV Could Overwhelm the Internet Warns Analyst, 
SLASHGEAR (Dec. 30, 2010), http://www.slashgear.com/smart-tv-coul-overwhelm-the-
internet-warns-analyst-30122009/.  
 17 FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 5, at 19. The FCC has recognized the 
increasing applications of the Internet, and has chosen to incorporate the above-
mentioned applications in its rules on Internet openness. Preserving the Open 
Internet: Broadband Industry Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 17,932-33 (Dec. 21, 2010) 
(report and order) [hereinafter Net Neutrality Order]. 
 18 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech.”); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (concluding that 
the limitations on Internet communication for decency under Congress’s 
Communications Decency Act was a blanket prohibition that chills free speech). Courts 
and some scholars, unsurprisingly, have discussed this theory already. See generally 
Moran Yemini, Mandated Network Neutrality and the First Amendment: Lessons from 
Turner and a New Approach, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2008); Christopher S. Yoo, Free 
Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an Unintermediated Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 697 (2010); see also infra note 23. 
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Such questions, which strongly seem to implicate constitutional 
liberties, are directly affected by network neutrality, an issue 
that is transforming Internet accessibility’s legal framework in 
the United States.19 Network (net) neutrality is a movement 
toward “the non-discriminatory interconnectedness among data 
communication networks that allows users to access the 
content, and run the services, applications, and devices of their 
choice.”20 The movement has emerged in the face of strong 
indications that the Internet is becoming (or has become) a 
privately regulated infrastructure where ISPs have the power 
to impede accessibility to the information exchanged over their 
networks.21 Bafflingly, the rise of private control over the 
Internet has been met with the fall of FCC oversight, even 
though the agency has for decades been tasked with 
maintaining nondiscriminatory access to telecommunications.22 
  
 19 See, e.g., Robert C. Post, A Progressive Perspective on Freedom of Speech, in 
THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 179, 185 (Jack N. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (Net 
neutrality “will hugely impact the precise ways in which the Internet will contribute to 
the formation of public opinion.”); Noam Cohen, Internet Proposal from Google and 
Verizon Raises Fears for Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010, at B3, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/business/media/16link.html; Raze the Mystery House: 
America Needs Clearer Laws to Regulate Internet Access, ECONOMIST, Apr. 10, 2010, at 
35, available at http://www.economist.com/node/15867976; Al Franken, The Most 
Important Free Speech Issue of Our Time, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 20, 2010, 8:43 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/al-franken/the-most-important-free-s_b_798984.html.  
 20 Yemini, supra note 18, at 2 (quoting Sasha D. Meinrath & Victor D. 
Pickard, The New Network Neutrality: Criteria for Internet Freedom, INT’L J. OF 
COMMC’NS L. & POL’Y, Winter 2008, at 2, available at http://www.victorpickard.com/ 
upload/The_New_Network_Neutrality.pdf). Lawrence Lessig captures the concept well 
in an interview with Democracy Now!:  
Think about the electricity grid. Alright, when you plug a television into the 
electricity grid, it doesn’t ask, “Is it a Sony television or a Panasonic 
television?” It doesn’t ask, “Is it a toaster made in America or a toaster made 
in Japan?” It just runs. It just works. And that’s because the electricity grid is 
a neutral network in this sense. You comply with the protocols—what the 
plug’s got to look like and how much power you’re taking—and it runs. That’s 
the way the internet was. It used to be it didn’t matter whether it was a 
browser made by Microsoft or a browser made by Netscape or a browser made 
by Mozilla. It just ran because the protocols said if you follow the rules, the 
system will run. 
Interview by Amy Goodman, Democracy Now!, with Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, 
Stanford Law Sch. (Apr. 17, 2008), available at http://www.democracynow.org/ 
2008/4/17/law_professor_lawrence_lessig_on_net [hereinafter Lessig Interview].  
 21 See infra Part I. 
 22 See infra Part I.A; see also Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 
(2006) (“For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in 
communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the 
people of the United States, without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, 
national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio 
communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges, . . . there is 
created a commission to be known as the ‘Federal Communications Commission’ . . . .”). 
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The impending degradations to Internet services imperil the 
freedom to access the most widely used forum for public 
expression in the world.23  
This note tackles the net neutrality problem from a 
practical perspective by suggesting and assessing a 
countermajoritarian regulatory regime that checks 
administrative and congressional action—a private cause of 
action based in constitutional rights. Rather than to solely 
outline the constitutional theory that supports net neutrality, 
the overarching purpose here is to answer whether, assuming 
the regulatory status quo, the federal court system is equipped 
to take on the role as arbiter of Internet-content-access disputes. 
In making that assessment, this note considers the multiple 
layers of constitutional protection that relate to the Internet-
access issue—the freedom of expression and the right to access 
for end-users24 as well as the freedoms of expression and 
property for ISPs.25 The model of judicial enforcement assessed 
here can appropriately weigh individual and intermediary 
interests by adjudicating the reasonableness of network 
management on a contextual, case-by-case basis. This note 
concludes that there is ample existing doctrine to direct these 
case-by-case inquiries. But there are obvious hurdles to directly 
applying these constitutional standards to end-user litigation—
namely, the state action doctrine and standing. Thus in 
conclusion, this note offers specific recommendations for 
legislation to facilitate the shift to judicial enforcement as a 
mode of Internet regulation that preserves the edges’ rights to 
access.26 Part I discusses the contours of the net neutrality 
debate and summarizes the nation’s policy regarding Internet 
accessibility. Part II describes the shortcomings of other 
  
 23 Communication theory coined by Marshall McLuhan states “the medium is 
the message.” Mark Federman, What Is the Meaning of the Medium Is the Message?, 
UNIV. OF TORONTO (July 23, 2004), http://individual.utoronto.ca/markfederman/article_ 
mediumisthemessage.htm. That is, a medium’s character is not the content it conveys, 
but the effect the medium itself has on society. Id. Here, content’s accessibility by 
Internet users is not the legal issue implicated; the issue is the functionality of the 
medium in conveying its impact. As related by Jerome Barron, “The new modes of 
communication engage us by their form rather than by their content; what captivates 
us is the television screen itself.” Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First 
Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1645 (1967); see also Yemini, supra note 18, 
at 15 (“[I]n order to ‘reach’ the logical and content layers, one has to ‘pass through’ the 
physical layer; whoever controls the physical layer, unless restricted by law, becomes a 
gatekeeper for all other layers . . . .”)  
 24 See infra Part III.B.1. 
 25 See infra Part III.B.2. 
 26 See infra Part IV. 
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available enforcement mechanisms, including administrative 
rulemaking and legislative action. Part III outlines the legal 
standards potentially applicable to constitutional litigation 
over a theoretical right to access Internet content and 
highlights the benefits of judicial enforcement. Part III also 
recognizes the challenges end-user litigants face. Finally, Part 
IV proposes a private cause of action for end-user litigants. 
I. THE FALL OF FEDERAL REGULATION, THE EMERGENCE 
OF NON-NEUTRALITY 
As private control over the Internet’s architecture has 
increased, the federal entities that would typically check that 
control have taken the back seat. In the current deregulated 
environment, the Internet continues to increase in day-to-day 
importance. This part outlines the legal and historical 
developments that have created this seemingly paradoxical 
situation—the shift to broadband infrastructure and the 
definitional hocus-pocus that has freed ISPs from common 
carriage regulation—then goes on to discuss the main points of 
the net neutrality debate. Finally, this part will detail the non-
neutral practices that have emerged since the onset of the 
FCC’s deregulatory approach to Internet access oversight.  
A. Creating a Non-neutral Network  
In the beginning the Internet was open. 
From its inception, the Internet has used a packet-
switching system,27 which was initially nondiscriminatory. 
Packet-switching has proven an extremely efficient mode of 
transfer because it allows information, divided into small 
pieces called packets, to exchange over any conceivable path of 
routers between Internet-connected terminals.28 In its early 
stages, the Internet consisted of a network of “narrowband,” 
packet-switched networks that were designed such that the 
  
 27 DAWN C. NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE SPEECH 
IN THE INTERNET AGE 19 (2009). During transfer, information sent from a computer 
terminal is separated into pieces that are then reassembled upon receipt. Id. The tags 
attached to packets dictate the packets’ destination as well as their source, in addition to 
identifying information to reassemble the information at the destination. Id. 
 28 The packet-switching system’s efficiency is due to the nondiscriminatory 
allotment of pathways between routers (to “empower the individual,” interconnecting 
router points as a “network of equals”) in contrast to the centralized, “hierarchical” 
circuit-switching infrastructure used by the AT&T telephone network. TIM WU, THE 
MASTER SWITCH 173 (2011). 
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long-distance infrastructure carried high-bandwidth traffic to 
limited access points. The connection to the end or individual 
users, though, was carried by separate, “last-mile” providers,29 
which delivered content to central facilities through basic 
telephone call technology.30 The old regime was inherently 
nondiscriminatory before the advent of broadband. First, on the 
physical level, telephone technology and wire use a simple 
routing process without any need for intermediary traffic 
modification. Second, on the logical level, Internet code uses 
the transmission control and Internet protocols (TCP/IP), 
which automatically allot service resources to an end-user on a 
“first-in first-out” or “best efforts” basis, rather than by the 
needs of an interested intermediary.31 These structural 
characteristics limited the entities’ ability to modify and block 
the traffic running over the last mile.  
The incumbent narrowband regime, which (at least 
initially) carried Internet providers’ services,32 was also subject 
to requirements designed to open competition under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.33 In 1984, the AT&T (Bell) 
telephone monopoly34 was ordered to divest its regional 
operating companies that provided local service.35 In turn, 
Congress passed the Telecommunications Act to combat the 
monopoly that “Baby Bells” enjoyed over the local exchanges 
and inject competition into those markets.36 Summarized 
succinctly, the Act forced the incumbent local exchange carriers 
  
 29 Last-mile providers were often the local telephone company. Id. But during 
the rise of the Internet, last-mile providers also successfully remained wholly 
independent from telephone carriers. See, e.g., id. at 262-63 (describing the AOL’s 
“walled garden” business model as wholly independent from the services provided by 
telephone-dial-up Internet). The separation between Internet transmission and 
services was implemented and maintained through the Nixon and Clinton 
administrations. Id. at 309. 
 30 Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help  
or Hurt Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 23, 31 (2004). 
 31 Gary S. Becker et al., Net Neutrality and Consumer Welfare, 6 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 497, 500-01 (2010); Yoo, supra note 30, at 32-33.  
 32 H.R. REP. NO. 112-51, at 3 (2011).  
 33 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. 
 34 The government argued in its 1974 antitrust suit against AT&T that the 
company unreasonably restrained trade in the telephone equipment markets in 
violation of the Sherman Act, Section Two. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 
139 n.18 (D.D.C. 1982). Judge Greene approved, but modified, the consent decree to 
divest the Bell Operating Companies from AT&T long distance, noting that AT&T, for 
years, used its market power over local telephone services to prevent the entry of new 
competitors in the local exchange and equipment markets. Id. at 223.  
 35 WU, supra note 28, at 194. 
 36 Id.  
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(ILECs) to interconnect with other companies that wanted to use 
the network, resell their services at reasonable rates, unbundle 
network elements, and engage in what has become a complex 
form of payment between carriers called reciprocal 
compensation.37 All these requirements were passed upon findings 
that the local, last-mile providers sat on a natural monopoly, or 
bottleneck, of information that allowed them to discriminate 
against competitors trying to enter the market of data carriage.38 
The 1996 Act therefore attempted to limit the extent to which the 
last mile could be dominated by a single entity—that is, as long as 
the last mile was a telecommunications service subject to the 
Communication Act’s Title II39 regulation.  
But today, the 1996 Act’s common carrier obligations do 
not apply to home broadband Internet services. Whereas 
telecommunications services are normally subjected to common 
carrier requirements under Title II of the Communications 
Act,40 because broadband service providers have been deemed 
information services, they are only subject to the lighter touch 
of Title I.41 This definitional dichotomy between computing and 
telecommunications services was created over the span of 
several hearings held to address the burgeoning computer 
market and its convergence with telecommunications.42 The 
delineation that emerged in those hearings was between 
telecommunications and information services and was 
maintained in the Telecommunications Act of 1996.43  
In 2002, the information services designation was 
extended from computing to broadband cable modems in the 
  
 37 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2006). 
 38 See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999) (explaining 
the natural monopoly in local exchange services); see also Daniel F. Spulber & 
Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The Hidden Side of 
Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV 1822, 1846-47 (2007). 
 39 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-261. 
 40 47 U.S.C. § 201(a). 
 41 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
975-76 (2005). 
 42 Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(quoting Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of 
Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, ¶ 8 (1971)). 
The earliest dichotomy contemplated was one between basic transmission and 
enhanced services, where basic services were regulated, and enhanced services were 
not. Id. at 211 (citing Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and 
Regulations, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, ¶ 2 (1980)).  
 43 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 975 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 153(20), (44) (defining 
information service and telecommunications carrier, respectively)). 
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FCC’s Cable Broadband Order.44 The U.S. Supreme Court 
affirmed the permissibility of that extension in National Cable 
& Telecommunications Ass’n (NCTA) v. Brand X Internet 
Services.45 In Brand X, the Court indicated that the FCC’s 
decision to regulate cable ISPs as information service providers 
was an acceptable construction of the Communications Act 
because cable companies offer an integrated “offering” of 
Internet services and their transmission, rather than a “stand-
alone” transmission service.46 The Court went on to find that 
the FCC’s decision to reduce cable Internet access regulation 
was justifiable due to the “fast-moving [and] competitive 
market” of Internet services.47 In other words, the FCC adopted 
the policy of deregulating the burgeoning Internet-services 
industry to avoid hindering its progress.48 As articulated by the 
FCC, “[E]xisting regulations constrain technological advances 
and deter broadband infrastructure investment by creating 
disincentives to the deployment of facilities capable of 
providing innovative broadband Internet access services.”49 
Soon after Brand X was handed down, the FCC issued its 
Wireline Broadband Order, which further extended the 
information service designation to telephone companies that 
provide DSL services.50 In turn, no broadband providers are 
currently subject to common carrier regulation under Title II. 
But, oddly, the information bottleneck has further spilled into the 
realm of hardware as networks have shifted into the broadband 
regime.51 This trend is problematic in the rise of broadband, where 
  
 44 Id. at 978-79 (discussing Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the 
Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002)). 
 45 Id. at 986. 
 46 Id. at 988. 
 47 Id. at 977. 
 48 Id. at 1001 (“The Commission concluded that ‘broadband services should 
exist in a minimal regulatory environment that promotes investment and innovation in 
a competitive market.’”). 
 49 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over 
Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853, 14,865 (Sept. 23, 2005) (report and order), 
petition denied, Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2007) 
[hereinafter Wireline Broadband Order]. 
 50 Id. at 14,862. 
 51 Perhaps towards a consumer desire for easy and secure use, the bottleneck 
has further pervaded home and mobile information, where providers increasingly 
“appliancize” the devices we use to access Internet protocol. JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE 
FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 3 (2008). That is, devices are 
purchased—often from the same company that offers access—to perform very specific 
functions with IP resources (consider your mobile phone or cable box). In turn, the 
ability of intermediaries to constrain end-user behavior is increased. Id. at 8-9. A new 
wave of proprietary networks in mobile broadband has created a separate chokepoint, 
where today’s popular mobile devices are only capable of accessing what is available on 
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intelligent data management hardware is increasingly used 
between the last mile and the core,52 and market power in the last 
mile of broadband continues to expand.53  
Though the United States has enacted no laws since 
Brand X that guarantee equal or open access to Internet 
content,54 the FCC has nonetheless clearly set a policy goal of 
digital connectivity.55 In 2005, the FCC issued a policy 
statement in an attempt to effectuate the goal of section 230(b) 
of the Communications Act of 1934,56 which states, “It is a 
policy of the United States . . . to preserve the vibrant and 
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and 
other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or 
State regulation.”57 The policy statement sought “to encourage 
broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and 
interconnected nature of the public Internet” by adopting four 
network management principles: 
• Consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of 
their choice . . .  
• [T]o run applications and use services of their choice, subject to 
the needs of law enforcement . . .  
  
the Apple App Store or Android Market. See Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 
17,925 (noting that a mobile wireless provider prevented users from using online 
payment options outside provider’s contracted service). In turn, the constraints upon mobile 
hardware are particularly susceptible to the hardware or network provider’s remote access 
to IP-enabled devices. See, e.g., Timothy Karr, Is Apple Launching a Pre-Emptive Strike 
Against Free Speech?, HUFFINGTON POST (June 22, 2011, 8:33 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/timothy-karr/is-apple-launching-a-pree_b_881940.html 
(reporting an Apple patent on technology that can shut down the iPhone camera remotely). 
 52 See, e.g., infra Parts I.C.-D.; see also Yoo, supra note 30, at 32-34 (describing 
the emergence of data-sorting technology between end-users to properly provide 
cable/Internet services over cable modems, and telephone/Internet services over DSL). 
 53 S. DEREK TURNER, BROADBAND REALITY CHECK: THE FCC IGNORES 
AMERICA’S DIGITAL DIVIDE 12 (2005), available at http://www.freepress.net/docs/ 
broadband_report.pdf. 
 54 The notable exception is the FCC’s recent Net Neutrality Order. See 
generally Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17.  
 55 See generally Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the 
Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 15 FCC Rcd. 14,986 (Aug. 5, 2005) (policy statement) 
[hereinafter Broadband Policy Statement]. The FCC’s policy of promoting competition 
over the objection of incumbent technologies goes much further back than the Internet. 
See Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968). 
Clearly, the FCC has taken a step back from this stance in the last ten years. Net 
Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 18,045 (Statement of Commissioner Michael J. 
Copps Concurring, FCC 10-201, 2010 WL 5179798, at *7) (“[B]etween 2001 and 
2009 . . . the FCC took American consumers on a dangerous deregulatory ride, moving 
the transmission component of broadband outside of the statutory framework that 
applies to telecommunications carriers.”). 
 56 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006). 
 57 Id. § 230(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
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• [T]o connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the 
network . . .  
• [And] to competition among network providers, application and 
service providers, and content providers.58 
While these principles clearly demonstrate a 
commitment to the underlying goals of net neutrality, in reality 
they still pose several problems. First, the Broadband Policy 
Statement lacks the force of law.59 And second, even if the FCC’s 
policy statement did have such authority, it lacks any 
cognizable measures to implement the policies set forth.60 
Therefore, as the law currently stands, there is little keeping 
ISPs from engaging in practices that discriminate against 
content to the detriment of end-users.  
B. The Debate 
The arguments for and against net neutrality can 
mostly be lumped into two fundamental, yet familiar, schools of 
thought.61 Proponents think that user competition benefits the 
path of innovation in Internet applications, and thus the 
government must preserve competition between empowered 
end-users in light of the growing market power network 
providers can leverage.62 Detractors believe that self-regulation, 
and even discrimination by private entities, will not adversely 
affect competition at the edges and—importantly—may more 
effectively preserve network economics.63 Some critics also 
argue that the incentives to engage in business models that 
discriminate against content or other Internet applications are 
not as readily obvious as proponents suggest.64 Indeed, AT&T 
  
 58 Broadband Policy Statement, supra note 55, at 14,988.  
 59 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 654 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Policy statements 
are just that—statements of policy. They are not delegations of regulatory authority.”). 
 60 Yemini, supra note 18, at 5. Several developments in FCC action have 
cropped up since the implementation of the Policy Statement to fill this gap in 
regulatory authority. See infra notes 114-15, 131-34 and accompanying text. As 
discussed later, there is little to suggest that these rules will survive litigation. See 
infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.  
 61 Unsurprisingly, the debate in Congress has remained consistent with party 
affiliations. Robert D. Atkinson & Philip J. Weiser, A Third Way on Network 
Neutrality, 13 NEW ATLANTIS 47, 49 (2006).  
 62 Daniel A. Lyons, Virtual Takings: The Coming Fifth Amendment Challenge to 
Net Neutrality Regulation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 65, 67 (2011); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, 
Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 145 (2003).  
 63 Yoo, supra note 30, at 56-59.  
 64 In part, the power to switch to other ISPs that do not discriminate against 
the content at issue is a viable choice for edge users, and would weigh against an ISP’s 
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has gone as far as claiming that the net neutrality issue is a 
“solution without a problem.”65  
Tim Wu, a proponent, characterizes neutrality’s central 
premise as “Darwinian”: only the “fittest” applications will 
survive the competition between developers.66 The argument 
comports with Schumpeterian “creative destruction,” the 
frequently invoked theory in technology policy premised on the 
notion that competitive innovation tends to build on and destroy 
preceding norms chaotically, yet progressively.67 Schumpeterian 
  
decision to engage in that type of practice. Becker et al., supra note 31, at 502. For this 
reason, among others, some describe neutrality regulation as “a solution in search of a 
problem.” Lyons, supra note 62, at 67. The FCC notes, however, that the ability to 
switch providers may not truly remedy the problem, where users may have limited 
access to broadband providers, and the cost of switching may be prohibitive. Net 
Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,921.  
 65 Grant Gross, AT&T Says It Didn’t Censor Pearl Jam, PC WORLD (Aug. 9, 
2007, 1:00 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/135767/atandt_says_it_didnt_censor_ 
pearl_jam.html. 
 66 Wu, supra note 62, at 145-46; Ex Parte Submission in CS Docket No. 02-52 
from Tim Wu, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, and Lawrence Lessig, 
Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, FCC 3 (Aug. 22, 
2003), available at http://www.timwu.org/wu_lessig_fcc.pdf. Google is an appropriate 
example. Google began in 1997 as a search engine quickly regarded as having “an 
uncanny knack for returning extremely relevant results.” Google History, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/about/corporate/company/history.html (last visited Sept. 9, 
2011). Google now offers a wide array of Internet applications—including but not 
limited to search functions, word processing, e-mail, social networking, and mapping. 
See GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (last visited July 24, 2011). Google has, in turn, 
dramatically changed the way end-users access web content. For example, Google was 
in large part responsible for the paradigm shift to “cloud computing,” which, as 
Google’s current website structure demonstrates, allows users’ applications and data to 
be stored remotely, then accessed from any location in the world with no more than a 
username and password. See Steve Lohr, Google and I.B.M. Join in ‘Cloud Computing’ 
Research, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/08/technology/ 
08cloud.html. Lawrence Lessig agrees that the value of Google is due in part to the 
Internet’s neutrality: 
Now, it’s because at no stage did they have to ask permission from the 
network owner that they’ve been able to do this. If, at the very beginning, 
Larry—Sergey Brin and Larry Page had to go to the existing network owners 
at the time, AT&T, for example, and say, “May we develop this new 
technology for your network?” it would have taken years for the company, 
AT&T, to even figure out whether this was going to be permitted, just like if 
they had gone to a cable company and said, “We want to open a new cable 
station on your network,” it would take forever to get that permission. 
Lessig Interview, supra note 20; see also Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,907 
(“The Internet is a level playing field.”).  
 67 Spulber & Yoo, supra note 38, at 1844 (citing JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, 
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 84 (1942)); Frank Rose, The Father of Creative 
Destruction: Why Joseph Schumpeter Is Suddenly All the Rage in Washington, WIRED 
(Mar. 2002), http://wired.com/wired/archive/10.03/schumpeter_pr.html.  
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economics appears to suggest that innovation and economic 
progress are protected through mandated neutrality.68  
According to neutrality activists, ISPs are incentivized to 
limit Internet access in order to prevent the utilization of 
competitive products or costly content, because they wield 
advantages in technology and law.69 These incentives trouble 
neutrality proponents in how the consequential practices would 
flout the benefits of an “end-to-end”70 design, undermining the 
“dumb” or nondiscriminatory Internet structure.71 Today, three 
industry practices stand at the forefront of neutrality literature: 
transparency, blocking, and tiering.72  
Professors Tim Wu and Lawrence Lessig note two 
important ways that mandated neutrality benefits the Internet 
as a medium. First, treating applications alike makes the 
market “predictable,” and therefore, incents the development 
of—and investment in—broadband applications.73 Like 
electricity, the Internet is a “general purpose technology.”74 Wu 
and Lessig note that in the current market for electricity, 
electronics manufacturers can design new products with peace 
of mind knowing that their products will work; “the uniformity 
of the electric grid is a safeguard against the risk of restrictions 
and uneven standards” that would give the electric company 
the power to discriminate against new products.75 Similarly, 
  
 68 Wu, supra note 62, at 145 n.10.  
 69 Some congressional representatives have come to this conclusion: “Internet 
access service providers have an economic interest to discriminate in favor of their own 
services, content, and applications and against other providers.” Internet Freedom 
Preservation Act of 2009, H.R. 3458, 111th Cong. § 2(10) (2009). For example, several 
ISPs have engaged in full-scale blocking of VoIP technology, which allows users to 
make phone calls over the Internet. NUNZIATO, supra note 27, at 9-10. 
 70 The “end-to-end” argument was drafted by Jerome Saltzer, David Reed, 
and David Clark, and “counsels against introducing intelligence into the core of the 
Internet.” Yoo, supra note 30, at 41. Under the theory, the better system is one that 
checks for errors only at the origin and destination of packet transmission—end-to-end. 
Id. See generally J.H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM 
TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYS. 277 (1984), available at http://web.mit.edu/ 
Saltzer/www/publications/endtoend/endtoend.pdf. 
 71 See Yemini, supra note 18, at 1 (explaining that through “technological, 
economic, and legal factors,” ISPs can now control the stream of data transmission and 
that data transmission was formerly controlled by the end-users themselves).  
 72 Atkinson & Weiser, supra note 61, at 49-50. 
 73 Wu & Lessig, supra note 66, at 3. The FCC noted that “[n]ovel, improved, or 
lower-cost offerings introduced by content, application, service, and device providers spur 
end-user demand and encourage broadband providers to expand their networks and 
invest in new broadband technologies.” Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,911. 
 74 Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,909. 
 75 Wu & Lessig, supra note 66, at 3. Congress seems to agree with this 
analogy. See H.R. 3458, 111th Cong. § 2(2) (2009) (“The Internet is an essential 
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investment in new Internet applications and infrastructure 
developments will be stabler if the resource is open and ISPs 
cannot block “undesirable” applications.  
Second, neutrality promotes the policy of innovation 
among applications.76 There is some speculation, given the 
current climate of law and technology, that ISPs will shift 
toward a tiered business model—one that charges fees when 
there is too much congestion on the network or that charges 
content providers for edge-user access to their sites.77 Such 
tiered access to content could prevent innovators from creating 
new uses for the Internet. For instance, if a search engine’s 
accessibility were treated more favorably than other sites on a 
network, developers would be incentivized to continue 
providing new Internet search features, without necessarily 
developing new media-streaming applications.78 The range of 
possible Internet applications would therefore be limited, and 
the benefits to end-user access decreased.79  
In response, those opposed to net neutrality regulations 
argue that “prophylactic” regulations could limit an ISP’s 
incentive and resources to invest in new infrastructure.80 
Though the neutrality agenda would further a right to access 
Internet content, vying for complete neutrality ignores the fact 
that there are inherent trade-offs between mutually exclusive 
network design characteristics. That is, if internetworks 
prioritize connectivity, network providers may sacrifice the 
quality of service (QoS) applications necessary to access high-
bandwidth content without latency.81 Some have therefore 
  
infrastructure that is comparable to roads and electricity in its support for a diverse 
array of economic, social, and political activity.”). 
 76 Wu & Lessig, supra note 66, at 5. 
 77 Becker et al., supra note 31, at 501.  
 78 The World Wide Web, for example, was created almost twenty years after the 
development of Internet protocols. Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,910. If the 
Internet’s initial development was stifled by network providers’ intermediation, the 
existence of the World Wide Web may not have become a reality. Furthermore, “[r]estricting 
[the] edge providers’ ability to reach end users, and limiting end users’ ability to choose 
which edge providers to patronize, would reduce the rate of innovation at the edge and, in 
turn, the likely rate of improvements to network infrastructure.” Id. at 17,911.  
 79 Professors Wu and Lessig note a similar example in online gaming. In 
short, under the current system ISPs are inclined to prohibit or disincentivize the use 
of popular online gaming applications because of the large amount of bandwidth they 
occupy. “If carriers choose to block online games in particular, this gives a market 
advantage to competing applications that have not been blocked.” Wu & Lessig, supra 
note 66, at 15. 
 80 Atkinson & Weiser, supra note 61, at 49. But see ZITTRAIN, supra note 51, 
at 105 (noting that maintaining the “generative Internet” has historically allowed for 
technology to overcome “blunderbuss technology regulation”).  
 81 Wu, supra note 62, at 148-49. 
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argued that forms of data discrimination are a viable remedy 
toward efficiency.82 There is certainly very little debate over 
whether network providers ought to engage in discriminatory 
practices when it comes to detecting harmful information 
packets, such as viruses.83 The contentious question is what 
constitutes “reasonable network management” within the 
context of the current deregulated market, and how far an ISP 
may go in invading and prioritizing the content an end-user is 
uploading or downloading.84  
C. Comcast v. FCC  
The landscape of Internet access law reached the apex 
of deregulation in 2010’s Comcast v. FCC85 decision from the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. The facts of Comcast show—
unequivocally—that when left to its own devices, the corporate 
intermediary has the ability and the incentive to impede end-
user access. The holding, on the other hand, may be the final 
straw in stripping the FCC of its power to regulate network 
management and, in turn, content access.  
In 2007, the Associated Press released a report 
confirming through “nationwide tests” that Comcast was 
engaging in data discrimination.86 By impeding traffic, Comcast 
kept peer-to-peer applications from “swallowing” bandwidth 
and thereby limiting the Internet experience of other 
subscribers.87 Comcast admitted to prioritizing service for this 
reason, but only after investigation.88  
  
 82 See generally Yoo, supra note 18.  
 83 See Wu, supra note 62, at 150-51; see also Internet Freedom Preservation 
Act, S. 215, 110th Cong. § 12 (2007) (Congress proposing to mandate neutrality except 
when “protecting the security of a user’s computer on the network”). 
 84 The FCC’s new rules on network neutrality purport to carve out the 
parameters of what reasonable network management is. See Net Neutrality Order, 
supra note 17, at 17,951-56. Free Press, Public Knowledge, and many other advocacy 
groups took issue with the broad definitions provided in the rules, particularly 
“reasonable network management.” Letter from Sean McLaughlin, Exec. Dir., Access 
Humboldt, et al. to Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, et al. 3 (Dec. 10, 2010), 
available at http://www.freepress.net/files/FCC_Letter_Real_Net_Neutrality.pdf. 
 85 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 86 Peter Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 
2007, 6:32 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/19/ 
AR2007101900842.html. 
 87 Id.; Comcast, 600 F.3d at 644. One peer-to-peer application affected was 
BitTorrent. Id. BitTorrent, as explained by the FCC, puts strain on the network 
because of its untraditional method of sharing information. See Formal Complaint of 
Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation, 23 FCC Rcd. 13,028, 
13,029 (Aug. 1, 2008) (decision and order), vacated, Comcast, 600 F.3d 642 [hereinafter 
Comcast Order]. Rather than directly connecting a user’s computer directly to a shared 
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By order of the FCC, Comcast reported the following 
network management practices: Comcast’s subscribers had 
been grouped together and routed to hubs through a Cable 
Modem Termination System (CMTS).89 There had been 
approximately 3300 CMTS hubs functioning in the Comcast 
network, and they had served several million subscribers.90 
Subscribers’ cable modems had shared upstream ports (content 
received from users’ cable modems) and downstream ports 
(content sent to users’ cable modems) on the hubs.91 In order to 
reduce congestion, Comcast installed hardware that analyzed 
the upstream traffic and managed information packets with 
characteristics that put undue strain on the network, in effect 
terminating the delivery of those packets.92 Comcast was 
careful to note that actual packet content was not inspected.93 
The FCC did not take sole issue with Comcast’s network 
management itself, however—what was more disconcerting 
was the fact that traffic-blocking targeted specific online 
conduct and “a customer ha[d] no way of knowing when 
Comcast . . . [had] terminate[d] a connection.”94  
After investigation, the FCC decided that Comcast was 
not engaging in “reasonable network practices,” and thus 
concluded that Comcast had violated the agency’s Broadband 
Policy Statement95 by “imped[ing] Internet users’ ability to use 
applications and access content of their choice.”96 The FCC 
ordered Comcast to file a disclosure statement with the 
Commission detailing its invasive network management 
practices97 and to suspend the unreasonable practices at issue.98 
The FCC claimed jurisdiction to rule on Comcast’s conduct 
through multiple sections of the Communications Act by direct 
  
server, BitTorrent uses a “decentralized distribution model” where pieces of a single 
file can be downloaded from other users simultaneously. Id. Therefore, extra strain is 
put on network bandwidth because the user engages in several Internet connections at 
once, as opposed to connecting to a “single, central pipeline.” Id. at 13,029-30. 
 88 Comcast Corp. Description of Current Network Mgmt. Practices at 1, 
Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp., 23 FCC 
Rcd. 13,028 (No. 08-183) (2008) [hereinafter Comcast Description]. 
 89 Id. at 1.  
 90 Id. at 2. 
 91 Id.  
 92 Id.  
 93 Only the “addressing, protocol, and other ‘header’ information that tells the 
network equipment what kind of packet it is” was inspected. Id. at 7. 
 94 Comcast Order, supra note 87, at 13,051. 
 95 Supra note 55. 
 96 Comcast Order, supra note 87, at 13,058.  
 97 Id. at 13,060. 
 98 Id. 
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and ancillary authority.99 Invoking Brand X,100 the Commission 
based its authority to regulate “facilities-based ISPs under its 
Title I ancillary jurisdiction.”101  
Comcast challenged the order in the D.C. Circuit, where 
the Court of Appeals held that the FCC failed to argue with 
specificity its statutory basis to regulate broadband data 
management practices.102 The FCC attempted to rely on its 
ancillary authority under Title I of the Act,103 as suggested 
regarding DSL service in Brand X,104 but the D.C. Circuit 
opined that the FCC would be stretching the Supreme Court’s 
precedent too far in arguing that this was a grant of “plenary 
authority over such providers . . . .”105 The court also rejected 
any argument that the FCC could draw ancillary authority 
from policy statements such as Section 151 of the 
Communications Act, which states the purpose of the FCC: to 
regulate “interstate and foreign commerce in communication by 
wire so as to make available . . . a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, 
and world-wide wire and radio communication service.”106 The 
court determined that legislative statements of policy—though 
conceivably declarations of the “legislative will”107—“alone 
cannot provide the basis for the Commission’s exercise of 
ancillary authority”;108 the FCC needed a congressionally 
delegated power to which the administrative agency’s action 
could be “tethered.”109 The court went on methodically to decide 
that each section of the Act the FCC cited (including common 
  
 99 The Commission relied on section 230(b) of the Communications Act as 
well as six other sections of the Act to justify exercising jurisdiction. Id. at 13,036. 
 100 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 101 Comcast Order, supra note 87, at 13,035 (quoting Brand X, 545 U.S. at 996). 
 102 Comcast v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Despite the D.C. 
Circuit’s conclusion, this was not the first time the FCC had exercised authority in 
preventing a carrier from blocking Internet applications and content. In 2005, the FCC 
adopted a consent decree requiring a fine of Madison River Communications, which 
was blocking ports used for VoIP traffic. Madison River Commc’n, LLC & Affiliated 
Cos., 20 FCC Rcd. 4295, 4297 (Mar. 3, 2005) (consent decree). 
 103 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2006) (“The Commission may perform any and all acts, 
make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders . . . as may be necessary in 
execution of its functions.”). 
 104 The Supreme Court, in dicta, stated that the Commission may 
“reconsider[] its treatment of DSL service . . . when it decides whether, pursuant to its 
ancillary Title I jurisdiction, to require cable companies to allow independent ISPs 
access to their facilities.” Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1002. 
 105 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 650-51.  
 106 Id. at 651-52 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 151). 
 107 Id. at 652. 
 108 Id. at 654. 
 109 Id. 
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carriage requirements110 and the mandate to implement 
broadband111) delegates no specific authority over the practice at 
issue.112 Thus, in one rap of the gavel, the D.C. Circuit created 
far-reaching consequences for the debate on net neutrality. 
More importantly, the decision has called into question the 
extent of a right to access Internet content—a guarantee that 
Internet users should expect to retain. 
D. Post-Comcast Developments  
To combat the trend of deregulation, the FCC has 
recently proposed and adopted rules for broadband 
management based on the Broadband Policy Statement,113 
which explains the enforcement mechanisms that will attempt 
to aid in antidiscrimination measures.114 In the recent order, the 
FCC established three broad rules toward preserving an open 
Internet: transparency in broadband management, a 
prohibition against blocking “lawful content, applications, 
services, [and] non-harmful devices,” and a prohibition against 
“unreasonable discrimination.”115  
While an important step in FCC regulation of Internet 
practices, the rules stand on unstable legal foundation after 
Comcast. The FCC faced challenges immediately after it 
released its Net Neutrality Order. Verizon has brought an 
appeal to challenge the FCC’s authority to enforce the rules.116 
The House of Representatives has also challenged the rules, 
moving to overturn the Net Neutrality Order through its 
powers under the Congressional Review Act.117 Contending that 
“the retail availability of Internet access service [has] never 
[been] regulated,”118 and noting the “sweeping” and “stifling” 
effect the rules would have,119 the House Committee on Energy 
  
 110 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 111 47 U.S.C.A. § 1302 (West 2001 & Supp. 2011). 
 112 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 658-61 (discussing 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 201, 257, 301-99b, 
543, 1302(a)). 
 113 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  
 114 See generally Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17. 
 115 Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,906. 
 116 Terrence O’Brien, Verizon Appeals Net Neutrality Rules, Let the Legal 
Wrangling Begin, ENGADGET (Sept. 30, 2011, 5:08 PM), http://www.engadget.com/ 
2011/09/30/verizon-appeals-net-neutrality-rules-let-the-legal-wrangling-be/. 
 117 Id.  
 118 H.R. REP. NO. 112-51, at 4 (2011).  
 119 Id. at 6.  
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and Commerce voted to disapprove the Order.120 The House 
voted in favor of the committee’s resolution.121  
Textually speaking, Congress’s resolution appears to 
harp on a meritorious argument. Comcast’s holding is much 
broader than a statement that the FCC lacks authority because 
there is no specific rule on network management: the court’s 
language explicitly states that the FCC has not shown tethering 
for a statutory authority to regulate the activity of broadband 
network management.122 As noted by Commissioner McDowell, 
the lesson from Comcast was that Congress “has not established 
a new title of the Act to police Internet network management, 
not even implicitly.”123 Nonetheless, the FCC stated in its Net 
Neutrality Order that it has ancillary authority to pass the rules 
under several sections of the Act, including section 706.124 But 
the D.C. Circuit ruled unequivocally that section 706125 does “not 
delegate any regulatory authority” for broadband network 
management.126 Therefore, without congressional action, the FCC 
cannot properly impose regulatory obligations with respect to 
network management on ISPs. This shift in regulatory authority 
suggests that it is due time to impart greater weight on the 
discussion at hand.  
* * * 
Today, the Internet is non-neutral, privately regulated, 
and free from oversight protecting individual freedom. For now, 
Internet users are stuck in the bottleneck. Some suggest that 
the incentive to block or tier Internet access is not economically 
viable for the Internet gatekeeper.127 But if private ordering 
were a sustainable solution, the incidence of traffic-shaping, 
  
 120 Id. at 13.  
 121 Tony Romm, House Votes to Repeal Net Neutrality Order, POLITICO (Apr. 
8, 2011, 3:45 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0411/52826.html. 
 122 Comcast v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“‘[T]he allowance of 
wide latitude in the exercise of delegated powers is not the equivalent of untrammeled 
freedom to regulate activities over which the statute fails to confer . . . Commission 
authority.’” (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 618 
(D.C. Cir. 1976))).  
 123 Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 18,053 (dissenting statement of 
Comm’r M. McDowell).  
 124 The FCC cited Sections 201, 230, 254, 628, 706, and Title III of the Act. Net 
Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,966-81.  
 125 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 1302(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2011) (“The 
Commission . . . shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of 
advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans . . . .”).  
 126 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 659.  
 127 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
2011] PROTECTING A RIGHT TO ACCESS INTERNET CONTENT 403 
blocking, and tiering should not have increased after Comcast. 
In fact, users continue to feel packet restrictions over home and 
wireless networks.128 In 2010, Level 3—the primary backbone 
provider for Netflix—engaged in heated negotiations with 
Comcast because Comcast began tolling Level 3’s traffic 
transmitted over the network.129 Even more recently, several 
ISPs have proposed and implemented tiered or capped access to 
the Internet in the mobile space.130 While there are economic 
arguments to support the beneficial aspects of private 
broadband, the public must begin to speculate as to its options 
should private intermediaries constrain the bottleneck to a 
point of no return.  
II. THE PITFALLS OF OTHER MODES OF PROTECTION 
Post-Comcast, regulators must look forward to fashion a 
regime that will better account for a right to access Internet 
content. Although the FCC may be disempowered to adjudicate 
the issues presented by non-neutral telecommunications under 
its current Title II authority, other federal powers with the 
ability to enforce individual liberties still exist. Considered a 
priori, a new approach to FCC oversight, antitrust litigation, or 
congressional legislation could each provide a meaningful 
method to regulate ISPs and account for end-users’ theoretical 
right to access. This section concludes, however, that these 
modes of protection face problems similar to, and even broader 
than, the now defunct FCC framework. 
A. Administrative Law 
This section proposes methods by which federal 
administrative agencies may step into the fray of Internet 
access regulation. First, this section will outline and criticize 
  
 128 See Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,925-27.  
 129 Comcast v. Level 3: Online Netflix Traffic Causes Fee Fight, USA TODAY 
(Nov. 30, 2010, 10:09 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2010-12-01-comcast01_ 
ST_N.htm.  
 130 AT&T has implemented a data-capping regime that charges a fee for every 
fifty GB of content over the 150 GB limit for mobile web users. Amy Lee, AT&T to 
Impose Broadband Data Cap, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 14, 2011, 11:21 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/14/att-data-cap_n_835318.html. Verizon also 
made the move to tiered data pricing in July 2011. Roger Cheng, Verizon’s New Pricing 
Plan is a Godsend for Sprint, CNET (July 6, 2011, 10:26 AM), http://news.cnet.com/ 
8301-1035_3-20077218-94/verizons-new-pricing-plan-is-a-godsend-for-sprint/?tag=rtcol;pop. 
If the AT&T/T-Mobile merger takes effect, Sprint will be the only mobile wireless 
carrier with market power that does not restrict bandwidth usage. Id.  
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the FCC’s Third Way—a proposal designed to reconceptualize 
the categorical approach to telecommunications policy. Second, 
this section will present similar and broader problems 
presented by antitrust litigation as a mode of protection. 
1. The FCC’s Third Way 
Comcast and its background decisions have greatly 
weakened an enforceable regulatory scheme that protects 
Internet content access through the FCC’s administrative power. 
In a frenzy to fill the regulatory gap created, Chairman 
Genachowski has proposed building a legal foundation for the 
regulation of Internet access by bifurcating the classification 
between Internet access and Internet content itself, allowing the 
FCC to regulate access to the Internet as a “telecommunications 
service” under Title II common carriage requirements131 and to 
regulate the information layer under Title I.132 This strategy is 
aptly nicknamed the “Third Way”—a third method of regulation 
beyond staying the course or reclassifying broadband Internet to 
Title II regulation altogether.133 The FCC bases its legal 
foundation for this reclassification on the dissent in Brand X, 
where Justice Scalia argued that transmission of broadband and 
computing were two separate “offerings” within the meaning of 
the Communications Act.134 
But as long as rules are based solely on the power of the 
FCC to regulate toward an efficient communications network,135 
there is ample room for regulation to run astray from 
individual interests in accessing the Internet’s content. For 
example, the historical trend is that the FCC pushes the 
boundaries of regulating indecent speech over broadcast.136 
Without tying FCC action to principles of individual freedom, 
Chairman Genachowski’s proposal and the attempted passage 
of the Net Neutrality Order stop short of guaranteeing access to 
  
 131 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 132 Austin Schlick, General Counsel, FCC, A Third-Way Legal Framework for 
Addressing the Comcast Dilemma, NAT’L BROADBAND PLAN (May 6, 2010), 
http://www.broadband.gov/third-way-legal-framework-for-addressing-the-comcast-
dilemma.html. 
 133 Id.  
 134 Id.; Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 1008 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he telecommunications component of cable-
modem service retains such ample independent identity that it must be regarded as 
being on offer . . . .”).  
 135 See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). The purposes of the FCC dictated in the Act 
make no mention of preserving access for individual expression.  
 136 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1806-10 (2009). 
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Internet content.137 That is, even if the FCC could regulate 
discriminatory practices limiting such access now, there is no 
guarantee that the FCC would do so in the future.  
Despite the passage of the Net Neutrality Order, the 
FCC’s regulatory capture and politicization present stark 
obstacles in appointing the FCC as the sole arbiter of end-
users’ individual rights going forward.138 In May 2011, after 
approving Comcast’s massive acquisition of NBC Universal 
(NBCU), Commissioner Baker took a position with Comcast as 
senior vice president of government affairs.139 This development 
is problematic because the Comcast-NBCU merger goes against 
obvious policy considerations in promoting competition and 
common notions of First Amendment theory.140 As noted by 
Judge Greene in precluding AT&T from entering the market of 
electronic publishing post-divestiture: 
If, under these circumstances, AT&T were permitted to engage 
both in the transmission and the generation of information, 
there would be a substantial risk not only that it would stifle the 
efforts of other electronic publishers but that it would acquire a 
substantial monopoly over the generation of news in the more 
general sense. Such a development would strike at a principle 
which lies at the heart of the First Amendment: that the 
American people are entitled to a diversity of sources of 
information.141 
2. Antitrust Enforcement  
The possibility of antitrust enforcement presents pitfalls 
equally deleterious to the end-user’s right to access. In 
February 2011, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) hired as 
  
 137 “There is a very strong presumption in most legal systems that other 
things being equal an interpretation which makes a law conform to a principle is to be 
preferred to one which does not.” Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 
81 YALE L.J. 823, 839 (1972).  
 138 Of interest, Rob Frieden explains that the FCC’s attempts to gain greater 
flexibility in interpreting its statutory authority could be motivated by the following: 
“[T]he FCC engages in decision making with a preordained outcome designed to accrue 
political dividends and support economic doctrine regardless of the facts and regardless 
of whether the decision unfairly and unlawfully tilts the competitive playing field in 
favor of one group of stakeholders over others.” Rob Frieden, Neither Fish Nor Fowl: 
New Strategies for Selective Regulation of Information Services, 6 J. TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 373, 415-16 (2008). 
 139 Joelle Tessler, Meredith Attwell Baker, FCC Commissioner, Joins 
NBCUniversal 4 Months After Approving Comcast Merger, HUFFINGTON POST (May 11, 
2011, 9:57 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/11/meredith-attwell-baker-
comcast-nbcuniversal_n_860889.html.  
 140 See infra Part III.B.1.b. 
 141 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 223-24 (D.D.C. 1982).  
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a senior advisor Tim Wu, a neutrality advocate and scholar in 
telecommunications policy.142 Beyond demonstrating the FTC’s 
intention to regulate the telecommunications industry, Wu’s 
appointment signals the FTC’s desire to gain consultation in 
regulating telecommunications economics. The FTC, along with 
the FCC and Department of Justice (DOJ), is vested with the 
power to require certain provisions in agreements between 
merging telecommunications companies.143 The FTC’s goal, of 
course, is to prevent unfair competition and deceptive acts in 
the marketplace.144  
The FTC’s role in regulating competition could 
potentially account for end-user interests through mandating 
competitive interconnection, and neutrality principles in the 
course of corporate mergers. But the degree to which 
interconnection requirements preclude other antitrust suits145 
may be unclear after the Supreme Court’s decision in Verizon 
Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko.146 
Furthermore, though the FTC may be qualified to monitor and 
enforce complex antitrust violations that may emerge in non-
neutral conduct,147 the FTC—like the FCC—is no less 
susceptible to partisan and sometimes shortsighted goals. Just 
as the FCC has no obligation to preserve the free-expression 
interests of consumers, the FTC and DOJ may likewise 
maintain minimal oversight when the American economy 
benefits from a potential merger despite other harmful effects 
that merger may entail.148  
Furthermore, mandating neutrality provisions in 
merger agreements poses the possibility of piecemeal 
regulation.149 That is, under the FTC’s review, an ISP may 
voluntarily take on neutrality principles with respect to some 
  
 142 Spencer E. Ante & Thomas Catan, Columbia Law’s Tim Wu to Advise FTC, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8, 2011, 4:37 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274 
8703313304576132310943386724.html.  
 143 See 15 U.S.C. § 21 (2006) (vesting power of enforcement in FCC and FTC); 
16 C.F.R. § 2.31-34 (2010) (outlining process for consent agreement among filing party). 
 144 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).  
 145 See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 38, at 1874.  
 146 540 U.S. 398 (2004).  
 147 Cf. id. at 415 (expressing disfavor in granting a general court’s authority to 
engage in regulatory practices more typical to an administrative agency). 
 148 But see generally Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Files 
Antitrust Lawsuit to Block AT&T’s Acquisition of T-Mobile (Aug. 31, 2011), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/August/11-at-1118.html.  
 149 Consider, for instance, the problems that have emerged from siloed 
treatment of information services as opposed to telecommunication services, where 
both in fact provide identical offerings. See supra notes 38-53 and accompanying text. 
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forms of transmission, but not others. In the Comcast-NBCU 
merger, for instance, Comcast agreed to abide by the FCC’s Net 
Neutrality Order, even if the order was overturned by a federal 
court.150 The agreement did not, however, prohibit Comcast 
from blocking Google TV, an emerging television service that 
provides video programming over Internet protocol, but on a 
digital television set.151 A lack of uniformity with respect to 
neutrality principles undermines Internet connectivity where 
the bottleneck problem is particularly constraining—regions of 
the country that have no choice in deciding which broadband 
provider to use.152 In those regions, the market cannot remedy 
an ISP’s lack of net neutrality through competing providers’ 
ability to offer greater packaged access. 
B. Congressional Action 
Congressional legislation could potentially fill the gap in 
broadband regulation to preserve user freedom, but Congress 
must be careful to avoid crafting the systemic problems that 
created the non-neutral network in the first place. Congress 
has attempted on several occasions to fashion bills that, in one 
way or another, proscribe acts of data discrimination and 
business models that discriminate against end-users. In 2007, 
the U.S. Senate introduced the Internet Freedom Preservation 
Act to amend the Communications Act.153 The bill proposed a 
new section, “Internet Neutrality,” to be appended to Title I of 
the Communications Act.154 The new section would address 
largely the same concerns presented in the FCC’s Broadband 
Policy Statement, but it would more explicitly proscribe the acts 
of blocking, discriminating against, or degrading broadband 
service for accessing lawful content.155 In addition, the bill 
requires ISPs to transmit content in a non-discriminatory 
manner that never “impose[s] a charge on the basis of the type 
of content.”156  
  
 150 Sam Gustin, A Media Colossus Is Born: Feds Approve Comcast-NBCU 
Merger, WIRED (Jan. 18, 2011, 3:46 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/01/ 
comcast-nbcu/.  
 151 Id. 
 152 See Yemini, supra note 18, at 14 (“More than one quarter of consumers 
have only one choice between cable and DSL, and even in markets with both services 
available, customers usually face a duopoly . . . .”); see also supra note 64. 
 153 S. 215, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 154 Id. § 2.  
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
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The House of Representatives presented a similar bill in 
2009 that proposed to amend the Communications Act to include 
a section called “Internet Freedom.”157 In addition to protections 
similar to those listed in the FCC’s Broadband Policy Statement, 
the bill proposed to prohibit both charging a fee to access lawful 
content and providing or selling devices that prioritize traffic for 
content or application providers; more broadly, the bill mandated 
“offer[ing] Internet access service to any person upon reasonable 
request therefor.”158 Significantly, the bill attempted to give the 
FCC power to make rules protecting against data discrimination 
and other anticompetitive practices.159 Legislatively empowering 
the FCC to make such rules would greatly help to fill the 
jurisdictional gap between the FCC’s Broadband Policy Statement 
and rules for network management.  
But congressional legislation has two inherent 
limitations. First, with respect to rulemaking authority, 
mandating broad and unchecked regulatory power to the FCC 
has historically created the very threat that necessitates this 
writing.160 Second, legislation may codify overly specific legal 
regimes that cannot properly adapt to the dynamic technology 
that emerges in telecommunications. The Telecommunications 
Act, for instance, was created with the intention of opening the 
market for competition in telephony, but Congress could not 
adequately consider the emergence of Internet over broadband 
at the time of the Act’s passage. In turn, legislation left the 
medium untouched by the obsolete, siloed common-carriage 
requirements of federal law,161 and the populace continues to 
wait for a legislative solution.  
* * * 
Public sentiment and popular expectations do not 
control the federal regulatory powers-that-be; in fact, societal 
and governmental interests are sometimes in direct conflict. 
The FCC and its predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission 
(FRC), specifically, have been allowed leeway to infringe on 
normative expectations typically subject to constitutional 
protection.162 Therefore, if the only avenue to uphold citizens’ 
  
 157 H.R. 3458, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009).  
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 See supra Part II.A.1.  
 161 See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text. 
 162 See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) 
(“[D]ifferences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First 
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interests rests in courts of appeals’ review of these infringing 
decisions, the Chevron standard163 categorically tips the scale 
towards affirming administrative regulatory decisions. 
Considering the rise of the non-neutral network, that 
framework is perilous to the establishment of a right to access 
Internet content. If, on the other hand, there is a competing 
forum for public outcry against regulatory action and 
communication-industry practices, ISPs and the government 
may be pressured to comport with individuals’ interests. 
Supplementing the FCC’s regulatory power with claims of 
individual right—in turn elevating the discourse on network 
management and pricing—thus avoids two pitfalls inherent in 
the other forms of regulation: first, users can be sure that they 
will have a claim available to them despite partisan effects on 
regulatory bodies; and, more importantly, the free flow of ideas 
can be secured in the Internet medium with a malleable 
standard despite the current lack of regulatory power under 
the Communications Act. 
III. THE VENUE OF LAST RESORT: FEDERAL COURTS 
In the absence of other oversight, federal courts can 
appropriately enforce a right to access Internet content; they 
have original jurisdiction over constitutional disputes164 and the 
ability to establish uniform rules.165 Though there are 
downsides to judicial oversight, the benefits are well-suited for 
the topic at hand. The underlying question, however, is what 
doctrinal “equipment” the courts can use to adjudicate these 
  
Amendment standards applied to them.”); KFKB Broad. Ass’n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670, 671 
(D.C. Cir. 1931) (upholding FRC’s decision to deny a radio license where doctor’s 
program was “not in the public interest”); see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Access to the 
National Information Infrastructure, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 51, 94 (1995) (“The First 
Amendment permits forcing some information conduits to accept content generated by 
others, but only when such forcing is necessary to permit the content to find its 
audience.”). But see FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1820-21 (2009) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (noting the historically “dubious” and “incoherent” interpretation 
of the First Amendment with respect to broadcast); see also Net Neutrality Order, supra 
note 17, at 17,984 (FCC considering consumer First Amendment interests in issuing 
order); Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting FCC’s 
repeal of fairness doctrine for effect on First Amendment speech). 
 163 “[A]mbiguities in statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are 
delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in reasonable fashion. . . . If a 
statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing agency’s construction is reasonable, Chevron 
requires a federal court to accept the agency’s construction of the statute.” Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005) (citing Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 & n.11 (1984)). 
 164 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 165 See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text. 
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disputes. This part will detail the constitutional doctrine 
applicable to an end-user’s challenge and address its current 
hurdles absent the existence of a private right of action—state 
action and standing. Incidentally, this part explores the contours 
of a theoretical right to access Internet content. To be clear, the 
goal of this section is not to argue that a non-neutral network 
violates the Constitution. Rather, in recognizing at the forefront 
that there is no express constitutional basis for litigation 
(though that point is arguable166), the goal here is to highlight the 
normative constitutional values that could inform a judicial 
avenue of redress to protect the end-user’s right to access 
Internet content. The considerations posed here will provide a 
basis for a legislatively created cause-of-action for end-users. 
A. The Benefits and Drawbacks of Judicial Enforcement 
Addressing Internet rights through the court system is 
appealing for two reasons. First, case-by-case adjudication will 
maintain the order of individual rights while considering the 
interests of ISPs. Contextual, fact-specific consideration will 
also account for new technologies that may modify individual 
and corporate interests without creating legacy limitations that 
entrench themselves in federal legislation or administrative 
rulemaking.167 Second, a broad power to adjudicate disputes 
between end-users and ISPs will avoid the constitutional 
problems that arise from overly specific congressional 
mandates168 and fill the regulatory gap left in administrative 
law.169 Furthermore, while net neutrality is an issue of 
technological infrastructure, the debate’s implications on 
personal liberty are so great that creating an additional, 
countermajoritarian remedial avenue based in constitutional 
doctrine may increase pressure on ISPs to properly consider 
individual freedom through their own self-regulation.170  
As noted by the FCC, case-by-case adjudication is 
preferred when considering data management regulation and 
  
 166 See infra Part III.C. 
 167 See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.  
 168 See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing First and Fifth Amendment protections of ISPs). 
 169 See supra Part II.A. 
 170 It is worth noting that the FCC certainly has free expression in mind by 
imposing its net neutrality rules. See Net Neutrality Order, supra at 17, at 17,906. The 
concern posed here is whether that standard can be maintained by FCC oversight. The 
history of Internet regulation suggests that it cannot, and thus, regulators are left to 
consider whether self-regulation may provide the proper oversight. But see supra Part I.D.  
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common carrier–type problems.171 Indeed, the complexity of the 
medium begs that regulators weigh interests in every dispute 
arising over its access.172 The language of the Communications 
Act also suggests a fact-based inquiry when assessing the 
regulation of the telecommunications industry.173 Some may 
argue that the FCC’s Title I case-by-case adjudicative authority 
is better suited for the specialized knowledge of FCC 
commissioners. But in applying conservative and static 
constitutional jurisprudence,174 courts are equipped to ascertain 
whether data management practices are overly broad or 
burdensome on an individual’s right to access information 
through fact-based inquiries.175 Further, establishing a separate 
avenue of adjudicative remedy in the courts will put action 
directly into the hands of citizens.  
Federal adjudication through constitutional discourse 
provides two further benefits. First, judicial interpretation of the 
Constitution can maintain uniform, binding precedent through 
the Supremacy Clause.176 Uniformity would therefore extend and 
preserve end-user rights to their maximum potential. Second, 
grounding ISP practices in limits delineated by the Constitution 
creates precedent that supersedes the actions of administrative 
agencies, and, further, signals congressional action.177 Decisions 
  
 171 Comcast Order, supra note 87, at 13,046. 
 172 See id.  
 173 See Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 201(a)-(b) (2006) (allowing for 
common carrier requirements when such action is “desirable in the public interest,” 
and as long as they are “just and reasonable”); see also Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United 
States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (weighing the public and private detriment 
caused by federal regulation of a telephone invention).  
 174 For instance, the First Amendment precedent stating that strict scrutiny is 
triggered when the government restricts expression “because of its message, its ideas, 
its subject matter, or its content” traces its origins to the 1960s. Police Dep’t of City of 
Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (citing N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269, 
270 (1964)). While the contours of this doctrine have changed over time, the origins 
remain in effect. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).  
 175 Stated simply, a court need not know much about engineering or network 
design to determine whether there are other means to achieve an ISP’s “compelling 
purpose,” or whether there is any reasonable purpose at all. See infra Part III.B.1.a. 
Those means can be proposed by the litigants themselves. 
 176 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 177 For instance, in 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in United States v. 
Lopez, that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause power in legislating a federal 
offense for “knowingly . . . possess[ing] a firearm at a place that the individual knows, 
or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.” 514 U.S. 549, 551, 561-63 (1995). 
The federal statute was later amended to include the “jurisdictional element” necessary 
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would therefore serve as a second line of defense should 
deregulation befall administrative action in the future.  
Despite these systemic benefits, Lawrence Lessig argues 
that “[U.S. citizens] don’t want courts choosing among 
contested matters of values,”178 values that are clearly 
implicated in the Internet-access issues presented here. Courts 
are ill-fitted to determine these values, argues Lessig, because 
translating Internet issues into matters of constitutional law 
will inevitably result in “political” decision making that 
“makes,” rather than “finds,” cyberspace’s expressive 
characteristics.179 Put more concretely, when factual inquiries 
are left to judicial discretion, the possibility of directing 
cyberspace’s architectural realities increases. These decisions 
are perilous to Internet architecture, concludes Lessig, because 
they will dictate what cyberspace will become, perhaps in a 
manner contrary to end-user desires.180 For reasons discussed 
briefly below, Congress can circumscribe the courts’ value-
oriented judgments through legislative specificity.  
B. The Rights at Stake: The Contours of Constitutional 
Litigation 
With the benefits of judicial oversight in mind, this 
section proposes some of the normative legal values that are 
relevant to end-user litigation. As discussed below, there is an 
initial hurdle to constitutional discourse because ISPs do not 
(at least ostensibly) seem to fit within the traditional state 
action doctrine.181 This section therefore, in part, applies 
constitutional precedent to ISPs by analogy, as if they were 
state actors. The end goal here is to provide and assess the 
relevant legal theory that may underpin a court’s decision in a 
hypothetical end-user challenge.  
  
to “ensure . . . that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce.” 
United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2005).  
 178 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 8 (2006).  
 179 Id. at 316-17. “We have tools from real space that will help resolve the 
interpretive questions by pointing us in one direction or another, at least some of the 
time. But in the end the tools will guide us even less than they do in real space and 
time.” Id. at 25.  
 180 Id. at 317. 
 181 See infra Part III.C.1. 
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1. Edge Users’ Rights  
a. Traditional First Amendment Protection 
There is no question that the Internet is a form of 
communication.182 The Supreme Court has confirmed that 
Internet content, if protected, can receive unqualified First 
Amendment scrutiny.183 Furthermore, Congress has found, as 
one of the bases of proposed legislation, that free speech is 
protected by “preserving the open nature of Internet 
communications.”184  
Impeding content due to agreement or disagreement 
with its message is a viewpoint-based regulation deserving 
heightened scrutiny under traditional First Amendment 
jurisprudence.185 Though the Internet has unique 
characteristics from other media, it does not have 
characteristics that set it so apart from the realm of speech 
that content- or viewpoint-based regulation would yield lesser 
scrutiny under First Amendment analysis.186 This is the case 
despite the fact that Internet “speech” can be omnidirectional—
that is, without a specified geographical or personal recipient—
and does not seem to fit neatly into the traditional, bimodal 
framework of speaker and government conceived by the 
Constitution.187 Therefore, as under traditional First Amendment 
protection, if restraining or degrading edge-user access to the 
core infrastructure were a form of content-specific regulation,188 
the First Amendment would provide protection under 
  
 182 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) (The Internet is “a unique and 
wholly new medium of worldwide human communication.”); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230 
(2006) (“The Internet . . . offer[s] a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, 
unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual 
activity.”). 
 183 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.  
 184 Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2009, H.R. 3458, 111th Cong. § 2(14) 
(2009). 
 185 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (citing Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).  
 186 Reno, 521 U.S. at 868-70 (noting that the Internet has not historically been 
regulated by the government and is not as invasive as radio or television, and still 
triggers unqualified First Amendment scrutiny).  
 187 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 576-77 (2002) (ruling that the 
question of “contemporary community standards” in the discussion of obscenity can 
still be applied in the context of Internet speech, even though there is no targeted 
geographic community in posting on a website). That is not to say, however, that the 
Internet is a clean fit in the First Amendment, two-speaker framework. See Yemini, 
supra note 18, at 41-49. 
 188 Turner, 512 U.S. at 642. 
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heightened scrutiny.189 The Supreme Court has also taken the 
position, however, that when speech and conduct are “joined in a 
single course of action,” there must be a balancing between First 
Amendment protections and broader societal interests.190  
On its face, issues of accessibility fit more neatly into 
the classical sense of content-neutral regulation. But in fact, 
accessibility can create both content-specific and content-
neutral restrictions. In Comcast, the network management 
technology at issue did not affect categories of content, but 
rather modes of transfer.191 In fact, Comcast is very clear that 
the content of information it transmits is not inspected.192 
Comcast’s definition of content, however, may be too narrow in 
this discussion. Content’s definition is rapidly changing in the 
world of electronic files and digital conveyance of information. 
The authorship of an electronic document is said by many to 
yield a privilege under the doctrine of attorney work product.193 
This would indicate that law regards protocol tags and 
metadata as document content, treating such tags the same 
way as a law firm’s internal memoranda.194 Comcast’s definition 
also fails to recognize that impeding one type of file transfer 
could disproportionately affect a category of content associated 
with that transfer. For example, ISPs could easily identify—
and in turn limit or de-prioritize—online gaming tags, which 
are distinguishable among others.195 It would be difficult to 
argue that such a practice is “content-neutral”; the practice 
appears to directly target a category of speech.196 Furthermore, 
  
 189 Id. 
 190 City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc. 476 U.S. 488, 495 (1986) 
(citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)).  
 191 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 192 Comcast Description, supra note 88, at 7. 
 193 The American Bar Association has ethical rules regarding the inadvertent 
disclosure of metadata, or the “data about data” (author, date of authorship, etc.) in an 
electronic document. See generally Joshua J. Poje, Metadata Ethics Opinions Around 
the U.S., ABA, http://www.abanet.org/tech/ltrc/fyidocs/metadatachart.html (last 
updated July 20, 2011).  
 194 Similar to metadata, the Second Circuit concluded in Universal City 
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001), that computer code is in fact 
“speech” under the First Amendment. Id. at 445. In determining whether restriction of 
code was content-neutral, the court also noted whether the “regulated activity is 
sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the 
First . . . Amendment.” Id. at 450 (internal quotation marks omitted). Information 
packets clearly fall within these parameters. 
 195 See Wu, supra note 62, at 168 (noting that ISPs could block online gaming 
through application information).  
 196 See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“Our precedents 
thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or 
impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.”). In fact, ISPs 
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lazy packet inspection to reduce congestion may sweep up 
unintended content.197 Courts should analyze any of these 
situations under a traditional, heightened scrutiny if the end-
user does not explicitly agree to the specific practice. 
b. Public Forums, the Right to Access Information, and 
the Free Flow of Ideas 
In the modern age, where corporate media operate as 
gatekeepers to several of the most accessible means of relaying 
information, some have suggested a contextual approach to 
First Amendment protection, one—in contrast to the 
traditional view that the First Amendment is a restriction on 
what actors cannot proscribe—which asks informational 
gatekeepers to create opportunities for expression to be 
heard.198 Indeed, “[a] realistic view of the first amendment 
requires recognition that a right of expression is somewhat thin 
if it can be exercised only at the sufferance of the managers of 
mass communications.”199 This approach applies more neatly 
than the traditional approach discussed above. 
The contextual, or affirmative, construction of the First 
Amendment was most famously declared by Justice Black: 
[The First] Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest 
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic 
sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a 
condition of a free society. Surely a command that the government 
itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-
  
including Comcast have not maintained complete integrity in shaping traffic without 
any consideration of content. In a clear example of content-based discrimination, 
Comcast was found censoring e-mails sent from antiwar groups on two separate 
occasions. NUNZIATO, supra note 27, at 5-7. In another instance, Comcast blocked 
access to Gmail and Google for their Boston subscribers, suggesting that subscribers 
switch over to Comcast e-mail. Id. at 11. 
 197 Comcast’s data regulation technology, for example, creates session 
thresholds for P2P applications specifically, without considering whether an overall 
traffic threshold is met. Comcast Description, supra note 88, at 8-9. In effect, P2P 
protocols are identified and limited without consideration of the overall strain on the 
network, simply because these protocols are known to cause congestion. 
 198 See Post, supra note 19, at 183 (“Even speech that seems on its surface 
irrelevant to politics . . . serves to focus and clarify public values and commitments. 
That is why constitutional protection should be extended to media of 
communication . . . .”); Barron, supra note 23, at 1655-56 (“Today ideas reach the 
millions largely to the extent they are permitted entry into the great metropolitan 
dailies, news magazines, and broadcasting networks. . . . As a constitutional theory of 
the communication of ideas, laissez faire is mainfestly [sic] irrelevant.”). 
 199 Barron, supra note 23, at 1648 (1967). Barron’s work, though it precedes 
the issue addressed in this note, is eerily relevant.  
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governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon 
that constitutionally guaranteed freedom.200 
The role of government as a speech enhancer, contemplated by 
Justice Black, shifts the focus of the First Amendment from 
protecting the speaker to protecting the listener.201 It is supported 
in part by the doctrines of public forum, common carriage, and 
fairness.202 Henry Perritt has found additional support for a right 
to access cyberspace through common carrier requirements, the 
antitrust essential facilities doctrine, and contract law.203 Under 
this affirmative theory, preserving the free flow of ideas will differ 
when discussing radio as opposed to television, or newspaper as 
opposed to the Internet: each medium has a distinct abundance of 
resources and only a certain number of adequate alternative 
forms of expression that competently yield the same 
communicative effect.204 Therefore, the Internet’s unique 
characteristics must be considered when determining the mode 
and extent of the government’s intervention.  
Although an intermediary’s right to broadcast and 
editorialize the information it chooses conflicts with the right to 
access lawful content, such a right has been recognized and 
furthered by the FCC and the Supreme Court alike.205 In Red 
  
 200 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (emphasis added); 
see also Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (“The maintenance of the 
opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive 
to the will of the people and that charges may be obtained by lawful means . . . is a 
fundamental principle of our constitutional system.”). 
 201 “What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything 
worth saying shall be said.” Post, supra note 19, at 181 (quoting ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 26 
(1960)); see also Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980) (“Free 
speech carries with it some freedom to listen.”).  
 202 NUNZIATO, supra note 27, at 41. The constitutionality of the fairness 
doctrine is addressed at length in Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-401 (1969). 
Though common carriage is not explicitly mentioned in the Telecommunications Act 
common carrier designation, it has been argued that Internet services meet the legal 
standard for a common carriage industry. See generally James B. Speta, A Common 
Carrier Approach to Internet Connection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225 (2002).  
 203 Perritt, supra note 162, at 61-62. For a brief discussion of the feasibility of 
federal protection under antitrust and common carriage doctrines, see supra Part II.A. 
The essential facilities doctrine, which explicitly emerged in the 1970s, allows courts to 
issue injunctive relief requiring monopolists to open “irreproducible bottleneck 
resources” to their rivals. Spulber & Yoo, supra note 38, at 1828-29.  
 204 Barron, supra note 23, at 1650-53; see also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 
97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The moving picture screen, the radio, the 
newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and the street corner orator have differing 
natures, values, abuses and dangers.”). Supreme Court jurisprudence supports this 
conception of the First Amendment. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) 
(discussing the roles history, scarcity, and invasiveness play in informing First 
Amendment protection).  
 205 See infra Part III.B.2.a.  
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Lion Broadcasting v. FCC,206 for example, a radio broadcaster 
challenged the constitutionality of the FCC’s “fairness doctrine” 
and related regulations, which required “reply time” for those who 
were personally attacked over the airwaves.207 The doctrine was 
designed to further two main duties held by broadcast licensees: 
to “give adequate coverage to public issues” and to create fair 
coverage that “accurately reflects the opposing views.”208 Faced 
with a First Amendment challenge, the Supreme Court reasoned 
that Congress, and in turn the FCC, has the authority to regulate 
broadcast licensees’ conveyance of information due to the scarcity 
of the medium and “the legitimate claims of those unable without 
governmental assistance to gain access to [radio] frequencies for 
expression of their views.”209  
Though the fairness doctrine is no longer in effect, Red 
Lion implicitly upholds a normative right held by the public to 
access all viewpoints through commonly used media and 
government’s authority to enact, in its power, what is 
necessary to effect that access given the nature of the 
medium.210 Boiled down, the fairness doctrine’s practical 
ramification is an extension of affirmative First Amendment 
obligations on private broadcasters. The Supreme Court would 
later find that the Internet lacks the scarcity concerns posed by 
the radio spectrum,211 but the effect on the right to access is 
nearly identical when Internet users are blocked from 
accessing online information. That is, limitation on the 
accessibility of an online discussion board or blog would be 
substantially similar to the limitations imposed by 
broadcasters that impede access to the free flow of ideas.  
Legally speaking, however, the standard of review for 
an impediment to access is not entirely clear. And moreover, 
the Supreme Court has shown signs of scaling back its right-to-
access interpretation of the First Amendment. In American 
Library Ass’n v. United States,212 the Supreme Court ruled that 
library-provided Internet was not a traditional public forum 
  
 206 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
 207 Id. at 373-75 (quoting 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (repealed 
1987)).  
 208 Id. at 377.  
 209 Id. at 389, 400-01.  
 210 See id. at 390 (“It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an 
uninhabited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to 
countenance monopolization of that market.” (citing Associated Press v. United States, 
326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945))). 
 211 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). 
 212 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
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and therefore held that congressional legislation imposing 
limitations on library Internet access was constitutional under 
reduced scrutiny.213 As the Court stated, a public library “provides 
Internet access, not to encourage a diversity of views from private 
speakers, . . . but for the same reasons it offers other library 
resources: to facilitate research, learning, and recreational 
pursuits.”214 The Court’s interpretation of public forums appears, 
however, not to be a wholesale exclusion of the Internet, but 
rather a narrow interpretation of library-offered Internet.215  
Indeed, when it comes to accessing primary sources 
online, outside of a library, recent events illustrate how the 
Internet may provide exclusive means to access some forms of 
information, thereby deserving a greater degree of protection.216 
After the Iranian election of 2009 was met with popular unrest, 
Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook exploded with content 
exposing the violent turmoil, which was otherwise limited from 
exportation.217 In fact, some observers reported that news 
stations needed the Twitter and YouTube content to cover 
Iran’s protests.218 The Iran protests demonstrate that the 
Internet provides the potential for a direct conduit between 
public events and society—an important, unintermediated, and 
informative experience worthy of protection.219  
When adjudicating issues of free expression, courts 
sometimes weigh the information sought as well.220 It would 
flout the central policy of constitutional protection to contend 
  
 213 NUNZIATO, supra note 27, at 81-82 (citing Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194).  
 214 Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 206. 
 215 See id. at 205 (“Internet access in public libraries is neither a ‘traditional’ 
nor a ‘designated’ public form.” (emphasis added)).  
 216 Cf. Saxbe v. Wash. Post, 417 U.S. 843, 847-48 (1974) (reasoning that prison 
policy banning face-to-face meetings with inmates by unaffiliated individuals was not 
violation of First Amendment, in part, because journalists can attain information from 
prisons in other ways besides face-to-face interviews). 
 217 Brad Stone & Noam Cohen, Social Networks Spread Defiance Online, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 16, 2009, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/16/world/ 
middleeast/16media.html?_r=1. 
 218 Twitter 1, CNN 0, ECONOMIST, June 18, 2009, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/13856224?story_id=13856224. 
 219 In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the 
press’s access to a criminal trial is protected under the First Amendment. 448 U.S. 555, 
580 (1980). Important to that holding was the Court’s reasoning regarding the role of 
the press, which “contribute[s] to public understanding of the rule of law” by “supplying 
the representations or reality of the real life drama once available only in the 
courtroom.” Id. at 572-73.  
 220 Compare Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 862 (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting the 
important press function in accessing information toward “preserving free public 
discussion of governmental affairs”), with Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569 
(concluding that the function of a public trial is indispensible in American law). 
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that Internet access should be guaranteed to access unlawful 
information.221 Furthermore, unfettered access to unlawful or 
harmful content would create congestion over ISP networks that 
could substantially decrease accessibility to other, lawful 
content.222 Even in the context of free expression, the First 
Amendment does not offer protection to obscenity, defamation, 
and incitement.223 In recent discussion, there has been some 
attack on the Internet site WikiLeaks224 for how it potentially 
compromises national security.225 But the general principle should 
hold for WikiLeaks and the like: the government has a “heavy 
burden” to justify prior restraint on the spread of information;226 
dissemination of such information should only be restrained if it 
would “gravely prejudice the defense interests of the United 
States or result in irreparable injury to the United States.”227 
That said, the notion that courts ought to make value 
judgments with respect to speech is inherently suspect. Indeed, 
recent First Amendment jurisprudence seems to reject this 
approach outright.228 But the separation of powers easily 
provides a counterbalance. In making a cause of action for end-
users, Congress can use constitutional jurisprudence to 
circumscribe the “lawful content”229 to which a litigant can seek 
access.230 In turn, value judgments would not be left to judicial 
discretion, but rather to carefully detailed, bright-line rules. 
  
 221 The First Amendment historically does not protect obscenity, Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), or “fighting words,” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568, 572 (1942), for example. 
 222 See infra notes 257-58 and accompanying text. 
 223 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010).  
 224 WIKILEAKS, http://www.wikileaks.org (last visited Sept. 11, 2011). 
 225 See Greg Miller, CIA Launches Task Force to Assess Impact of U.S. Cables’ 
Exposure by WikiLeaks, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2010, 12:24 AM), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/21/AR2010122104599.html? 
hpid=topnews&sid=ST2010122105304.  
 226 N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). 
 227 United States v. Wash. Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327, 1328 (D.C. Cir.), aff’d, 403 
U.S. 713 (1971). 
 228 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585 (“The First Amendment’s guarantee of free 
speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of 
relative social costs and benefits.”). 
 229 This language is pulled from the Net Neutrality Order as a primer for the 
base-level protections the cause-of-action could seek to protect. See Net Neutrality 
Order, supra note 17, at 17,906. 
 230 See infra notes 316-18 and accompanying text. 
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2. Rights of ISPs 
a. First Amendment Protection for Conduit Speech 
Just as the First Amendment affords protection to 
individual speakers, it also affords protection to commercial 
enterprises, or conduits, that carry individuals’ speech.231 In cable 
television, for instance, the Supreme Court has held that 
editorial discretion in selecting content under its services is 
within the scope of First Amendment protection.232 Similarly, a 
public library’s decision to exclude materials does not trigger 
heightened scrutiny.233 In Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC,234 
a cable television case, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
whether a congressional act requiring cable operators to relay 
local broadcasts was an infringement on the freedom of speech 
or of the press.235 The Court applied intermediate scrutiny to the 
Act,236 stating first that laws singling out a medium are subject 
“to at least some degree of heightened First Amendment 
scrutiny,”237 then concluding that the Act was content neutral.238  
The FCC and others have argued that intermediate 
scrutiny should likewise apply to a federal neutrality 
mandate.239 But cases dealing with media suggest that the First 
Amendment interests of media consumers outweigh the 
providers’ interests at some point, proportional in part to how 
much of a speech “conduit” the provider is.240 Important to recall 
  
 231 See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (“Cable 
programmers and cable operators engage in and transmit speech, and they are entitled 
to the protection of the speech and press provisions of the First Amendment.”). 
 232 City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986) 
(concluding that expression by a cable operator includes “exercising editorial discretion 
over which stations or programs to include in its repertoire”). 
 233 United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 208 (1993).  
 234 512 U.S. 622. 
 235 Id. at 626. 
 236 Id. at 661-62. 
 237 Id. at 640-41. 
 238 Id. at 622, 647. Some have argued that the standard of review was 
“intermediate plus,” where it “decidedly privileges speech rights over values.” Yemini, 
supra note 18, at 25 (quoting Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy and Free Speech: The 
First Amendment at War With Itself, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1211, 1219 (2007)).  
 239 Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,983; Yemini, supra note 18, at 
20-22. Yemini argues that, similar to a cable operator, an ISP would just as easily 
engage in protected expression under Turner by blocking a website, for example. Id. at 
18-20. In fact, Yemini suggests, to argue that ISPs do not engage in protected editorial 
discretion would be a contradictory position for net neutrality activists, where such 
discretion is essentially the conduct in question when engaging in data discrimination. 
Id. at 18-19. 
 240 NUNZIATO, supra note 27, at 138 (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 
U.S. 367 (1969); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)).  
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is that the First Amendment’s protections vary with the 
carrying medium.241 Unlike cable television, Internet content is 
primarily created by end-users. Even the largest corporate 
content providers are search engines and social networking 
sites, which derive most of their Internet traffic from end-user 
contributions. Furthermore, the type of “editorial discretion” 
argued by ISPs “bears little resemblance to an editor’s choosing 
which programs [like in cable television] . . . to carry.”242 The 
FCC went further in its Net Neutrality Order to say that no 
court has ever “suggested that regulation of common carriage 
requirements triggers First Amendment scrutiny.”243  
Nevertheless, Wu and Lessig appear to be correct in 
that the governmental interests furthered by promoting 
neutrality are “important or substantial”244 enough to withstand 
intermediate scrutiny by the courts.245 As stated by the Turner 
Court, “assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of 
information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest 
order, for it promotes values central to the First Amendment.”246 
Indeed, when weighing conduits’ First Amendment interests 
against society’s in the free flow of ideas, the freedom of 
expression is at least as heavy as the freedom of editorial 
discretion under an affirmative conception of the First 
Amendment.247 But the cases also suggest that editorial 
discretion qualifies for greater protection as a service provider 
  
 241 “[D]ifferences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the 
First Amendment standards applied to them.” Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 386. 
Greater latitude is allowed in infringing on First Amendment rights in broadcast-radio 
regulation. Id. Very little latitude is granted in regulating print. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.  
 242 Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,983; see also Comcast Order, supra 
note 87, at 13,033 (“Unlike newspapers or radio or broadcast television . . . the Internet 
gives Americans ‘a great degree of control over the information that they receive.’”).  
 243 Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,983. But see id. at 18,073-74 
n.114 (dissenting statement of Comm’r Robert M. McDowell). 
 244 See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (quoting United 
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). 
 245 Wu & Lessig, supra note 66, at 10. The interests put forward include 
“promoting the widespread dissemination of information” and “promoting fair 
competition in the market.” Id. The FCC agrees with this reasoning in its Net 
Neutrality Order, but it provides somewhat different interests. Net Neutrality Order, 
supra note 17, at 17,984 (relating the important government interests that would pass 
intermediate scrutiny, such as “consumer choice, end-user control, free expression, and 
the freedom to innovate without permission”). 
 246 Turner, 512 U.S. at 663. 
 247 See Barron, supra note 23, at 1654-55 (quoting Associated Press v. United 
States, 320 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). But see Yoo, supra note 18, at 702 (“[I]n terms of deciding 
how that balance [between edge users and providers] should be struck, the cases 
indicate that free speech considerations favor preserving intermediaries’ editorial 
discretion unless the relevant technologies fall within a narrow range of exceptions, all 
of which the Court has found to be inapplicable to the Internet.”). 
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becomes less interested in the content of the expression being 
conveyed.248 From the vantage point of an Internet subscriber, 
Internet carriers should be disinterested in lawful content 
transmitted over their networks.  
b. Fifth Amendment Takings 
Another argument presented against the neutrality 
mandate is that governmental action would be a confiscatory 
taking under Fifth Amendment249 doctrine.250 The argument 
suggests that a limitation on network management practices 
would in turn limit the profitability of the broadband industry, 
or the choice to engage in new business models.251 When 
assessing whether a taking occurs, courts look to interference 
with “investment-backed expectations,” the “economic impact of 
the regulation,” and “the character of the government action.”252 
The FCC found in its Net Neutrality Order, however, that the 
Fifth Amendment challenges are without merit. The FCC stated 
that “takings law makes clear that property owners cannot, as a 
general matter, expect that existing legal requirements 
regarding their property will remain entirely unchanged.”253 
Case law seems to support the FCC’s finding as it 
relates to exercise of First Amendment rights. In assessing 
whether allowing demonstrators to handbill in a shopping 
  
 248 Henry Perritt observes: 
The First Amendment permits forcing some information conduits to accept 
content generated by others, but only when such forcing is necessary to 
permit the content to find its audience. When the entity burdened by the duty 
has relatively little interest in expression, for example if it is simply a router, 
the First Amendment allows a broader range of legislative and regulatory 
discretion to impose a duty because the harm to First Amendment interests 
is minimal. 
Perritt, supra note 162, at 94; see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 
(1969) (“It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, 
which is paramount.”). 
 249 “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 250 Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,985-86; see also Lyons, supra 
note 62, at 92-95; Rob Frieden, Internet Packet Sniffing and Its Impact on the Network 
Neutrality Debate and the Balance of Power Between Intellectual Property Creators and 
Consumers, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 633, 667 (2008); Perritt, 
supra note 162, at 93.  
 251 See, e.g., Lyons, supra note 62, at 95. Lyons also argues that the Net 
Neutrality Rules could be a per se Fifth Amendment taking under the permanent 
physical occupation doctrine of Loretto. Id. at 92-94.  
 252 Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,985 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 253 Id. 
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center was a “taking,” the Supreme Court stated in Pruneyard 
Shopping Center v. Robins that the true test to determine 
whether the public has—through state-granted free speech 
protections—confiscated property rights of an owner is whether 
the restriction “forc[es] some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole.”254 Applying that test, the shopping 
center’s Fifth Amendment claim failed because the owner could 
not show unreasonable impairment on value or use of his 
property, especially where the demonstrators were orderly and 
remained in common areas.255  
In the case of Internet accessibility, the benefit lost from 
ISPs’ data management practices would burden the entire 
industry. The government’s intervention would also not 
substantially limit the capability of the providers to compete. 
Moreover, the obligation to carry content without discrimination 
does not infringe on any physical space, so the challenge is 
inherently limited.256 
That is not to say that a Fifth Amendment challenge is 
completely without merit. It is at least foreseeable that a court 
could find reasonable a business model where ISPs compete 
over providing greater access to Internet content.257 In fact, 
modern-day consumers analogously subscribe to cable packages 
that function similarly—providers compete to provide bundled 
packages of content that suit the needs of the consumer. 
Furthermore, an overbearing and blanket prohibition of data 
discrimination could actually serve the opposite effect it 
intends if ISPs do not deploy new Internet infrastructure: a 
pure nondiscrimination mandate could sacrifice the ability to 
access content effectively for outright connectivity.258 If ISPs 
cannot meet their burden of providing the requisite QoS to 
their subscribers, then sites that demand high bandwidth will 
  
 254 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 
49 (1960)).  
 255 Id. at 83-84. 
 256 Perritt, supra note 162, at 93-94 (citing Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 
F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (invalidating order by FCC to allot office space of local 
telephone carriers to competing carriers)). But see Lyons, supra note 62, at 93 (arguing 
that mandated neutrality would allow a continuous right by content providers to 
“physically invade broadband networks with their electronic signals and permanently 
occupy portions of network capacity”).  
 257 See Becker et al., supra note 31, at 502 (discussing the disincentive of 
network providers to engage in data discrimination). 
 258 In other words, at odds with one another are the rights to connectivity and 
a “public interest in quality infrastructure.” Perritt, supra note 162, at 58.  
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not be available to users on that network, implicating the very 
problem that net neutrality seeks to remedy and decreasing 
service efficiency for ISPs.259  
C. Hurdles to Litigation 
The previous section shows that there is some doctrinal 
basis under which a court could adjudicate the facts of an end-
user litigation. Though informative to norms that should be 
considered in constructing a cause of action, the jurisprudence 
on its own is not self-executing in this context. Two doctrines 
are particularly noteworthy hurdles to litigation: state action 
and standing. Their respective merits and problems will be 
assessed here.  
1. Arguing State Action  
As Christopher Yoo has argued, “[I]nvoking [the] First 
Amendment as requiring governmental intervention to redress 
private power would stand the First Amendment on its head.”260 
In other words, the First Amendment is a protection against 
intrusion by the government, not by private actors.261 That is 
not to say, though, that constitutional restrictions cannot be 
imposed on private actors.262 Under Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence, for example, the Court has held that private 
actors may be bound by constitutional obligations when the 
state judiciary enforces racially discriminatory restrictive 
  
 259 Put differently, the issue of Internet access as a right is enforced by 
blanket prohibitions at the risk of creating a critical mass: complete deregulation gives 
ISPs the power to unduly discriminate against content, while over-regulation may 
make the content inaccessible to begin with. This effect would undermine the service 
the ISPs intend to provide. “We have a public network that is indeed a great creative 
commons for data applications, but it is less so for any application that requires a 
minimum quality of service. True application neutrality may, in fact, sometimes 
require a close vertical relationship between a broadband operator and Internet service 
provider.” Wu, supra note 62, at 148.  
 260 Yoo, supra note 18, at 700.  
 261 Id. 
 262 In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, the Supreme Court held that a 
restaurant that leased space from a Wilmington, Delaware, parking facility was a state 
actor because in leasing space from the city authority, and being maintained by public 
funds, the restaurant was “an integral part of a public building devoted to a public 
parking service.” 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961); see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 
U.S. 409 (1968) (applying the Thirteenth Amendment to private actors); Heart of 
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (same). Warranting further 
discussion, courts have in the past considered First Amendment rights of defendants 
sued under right of publicity claims. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball 
Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir. 1996).  
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covenants.263 In the context of Internet litigation, however, 
there is some indication that judges are reluctant to extend the 
state action classification to ISPs outright.264  
Nonetheless, there is an argument that ISPs may fall 
directly within the parameters of the state action doctrine, in 
turn allowing for direct constitutional enforcement. The Third 
and Fourth Circuits have stated that there are three distinct 
tests utilized by the Supreme Court to assess whether a private 
actor has crossed the line into state action. First, the court may 
consider whether the entity has “exercised powers that are 
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state” (or, in short, 
the “public function” test). Second, the court may ask whether 
“the private party has acted with the help of or in concert with 
state officials.” And in the final test, the court may determine 
whether “[t]he State has so far insinuated itself into a position 
of interdependence with . . . [the acting party] that it must be 
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.”265  
Public “insinuation” may be present in the Internet’s 
origins, where the initial connection of networks creating the 
Internet was instituted in large part by the federal 
government. In Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.,266 
the Supreme Court ruled, for First Amendment purposes, that 
Amtrak was a government actor subject to the limitations 
dictated by the Constitution.267 In reaching its decision, the 
Court compared Amtrak—a statutorily created rail service held 
through private stock268—with other government corporations 
like the Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat).269 
Similar to Amtrak, Comsat was created by the federal 
government, yet it is “capitalized entirely with private funds.”270 
The Internet was developed under circumstances similar to 
those of Amtrak and Comsat. Through the 1960s, one of the 
initial networks giving rise to the Internet, the Advanced 
  
 263 See Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1948) (holding that judicial 
enforcement of racially discriminatory restrictions is state action that warrants 
Fourteenth Amendment challenge). Here, portions of the Communications Act, 47 
U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, 201, 230(b), 256, 601, as interpreted by the D.C. Circuit in Comcast, 
600 F.3d 642, imposes similar restraint on the freedom of expression for Internet users.  
 264 See, e.g., Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 444 
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding that AOL is not a state actor). 
 265 Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141-43 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing 
Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211, 215 (4th Cir. 1993)). 
 266 513 U.S. 374 (1995). 
 267 Id. at 400. 
 268 Id. at 385. 
 269 Id. at 390-91. 
 270 Id. at 390. 
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Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET), was funded 
and developed by the Department of Defense for research 
purposes.271 The National Science Foundation (NSF), a federal 
agency created by Congress, extended the network connection 
to U.S. universities and beyond the realm of defense research.272 
One of the first national backbone infrastructures was, in turn, 
created by the NSF in 1992.273  
The government is also largely responsible for 
implementing the uniform system of packet-traffic management 
currently controlled by the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN).274 The federal government 
established ICANN in 1998, privatizing the root server system 
that informs subordinate servers of IP addresses.275 Without that 
arrangement, the Internet would have potentially grown into a 
set of redundant and conflicting internetworks.276 This fact is 
particularly relevant when considering the constitutional 
treatment of packet and network traffic management; though 
Internet services are provided by private actors, this does not 
detract from the clearly public origins that suggest a “close 
nexus”277 between Internet services and federal action.  
The public function test, considered in conjunction with 
the joint participation of government action in private 
enterprises, also provides meaningful guidance in determining 
the public nature of Internet control. Marsh v. Alabama278 
expresses the principle that the more a private party opens his 
property to the function of the public, “the more do his rights 
become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional 
rights who use it.”279 In simple terms, the public function test 
states that, at some point, private owners provide access to a 
property so fundamentally public in nature that the owners 
  
 271 A Brief History of NSF and the Internet, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., 
http://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=103050 (last visited July 31, 2011). 
 272 Id. 
 273 Id. 
 274 See STUART M. BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 
914 (2d ed. 2006).  
 275 Id. 
 276 See Improvement of Technical Management of Names and Addresses, 63 
Fed. Reg. 8826, 8827 (proposed Feb. 20, 1998) (proposing the coordination of the root 
server network to ensure the system “work[s] smoothly” and “preserve[s] the stability 
and interconnectivity of the Internet”).  
 277 See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (“[T]he inquiry 
must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the 
challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly 
treated as that of the State itself.”).  
 278 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
 279 Id. at 506.  
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begin to owe an obligation to protect “identical interests” to 
those held by citizens of a state or municipality.280  
In Altmann v. Television Signal Corp.,281 the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California 
ruled that the defendant cable company was a “state actor” for 
the purposes of a constitutional challenge. The court used 
language to suggest that it assessed state action based on the 
government’s participation in empowering the company to 
censor indecent public-access programming.282 Interestingly, the 
Altmann Court also noted the important function of public-
access channels “to serve as public forums, accessible to all 
interests, including those that may otherwise lack the 
resources to communicate through electronic media.”283 The 
court, in turn, concluded that the effect of allowing cable 
operators to block indecent material on these stations would 
likely fail strict scrutiny.284 This decision seems to apply here on 
two different levels, suggesting, first, that the government has 
a duty to preserve public forums in broadcast media, or, 
alternatively, that the government has imposed enough 
obligation on the cable operator to subsume its private 
interests.285 Marsh and Altmann considered in tandem present 
the possibility that courts may be willing to extend the state 
action doctrine in issues of First Amendment freedom where, 
as in Altmann, largely public functions are subjected to the 
requirements of facilitating public forums and where, as in 
Marsh, the private intermediaries that own the medium of 
expression have opened the medium to public discourse. To be 
sure, the Court has never ruled that the Internet is a 
traditional public forum,286 but, in any event, the 
unintermediated debate the Internet holds strongly indicates 
that it ought to be. Indeed, except to the extent limited by non-
neutrality, the Internet is a wide-open resource of access to 
information—suggesting its similarity to a sidewalk or square 
  
 280 Id. at 507. But see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 519 (1976) (narrowly 
construing Marsh). 
 281 849 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
 282 Id. at 1342-43.  
 283 Id. at 1340.  
 284 Id. at 1343. 
 285 See id. at 1342 (“Congress stripped cable operators of any editorial control 
over constitutionally protected speech.”). 
 286  The Court touched on the issue in United States v. American Library Ass’n, 
but the holding appears limited to the circumstances of library-provided Internet. See 
supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text. 
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deserving of public-function protection, even though controlled 
by private actors.287 
That being said, and in all fairness, the appropriate 
application of state action to ISPs is one that may be novel to 
normal constitutional discourse. Lawrence Lessig writes: 
Architectures constitute cyberspace; these architectures are varied; 
they variously embed political values; some of these values have 
constitutional import. Yet for the most part—and fortunately—these 
architectures are private. They are constructed by universities or 
corporations and implemented on wires no longer funded by the 
Defense Department. They are private and therefore traditionally 
outside the scope of constitutional review. The constitutional values 
of privacy, access, rights of anonymity, and equality need not trouble 
this new world, since this world is “private” and the Constitution is 
concerned only with “state action.” 
Why this should be is not clear to me. If code functions as law, then 
we are creating the most significant new jurisdiction since the 
Louisiana Purchase. Yet we are building it just outside the 
Constitution’s review. Indeed, we are building it just so that the 
Constitution will not govern—as if we want to be free of the 
constraints of value embedded by that tradition.288 
But if courts were to extend constitutional review to the 
issue at hand without legislation, Lessig is right to note that 
constitutional theory may not clearly provide the proper 
context.289 Other modes of speech are easily divided into two 
distinct and opposing forces: the government and the speaker.290 
The Internet, by contrast, is inherently a multispeaker,291 multi-
interest, or multilateral environment, mediated by 
  
 287 The logical conclusion from this fact is that the Internet should be treated 
as a common carrier, which seems “presumptively” appropriate. See Speta, supra note 
202, at 269. 
 288 LESSIG, supra note 178, at 317-18. 
 289 Lessig points out that the architecture contemplated by the framers of the 
Constitution, based in natural law and the laws of economics, is directly opposed to the 
man-made architecture of sovereignty in cyberspace based in code. Id. at 318.  
 290 Amit M. Schejter & Moran Yemini, “Justice and Only Justice, You Shall 
Pursue”: Network Neutrality, the First Amendment and John Rawls’s Theory of Justice, 
14 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 137, 162 (2007), available at 
http://www.mttlr.org/volfourteen/schejter&yemini.pdf; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I 
(“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” 
(emphasis added)).  
 291 Take, for example, the immensely popular online encyclopedia, Wikipedia. 
WIKIPEDIA, http://www.wikipedia.org (last visited Dec. 28, 2010). Wikipedia does not 
get its source information from a single user, but rather from an immense supply of 
edge user contributions for any single entry. Wikipedia: About, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About (last visited Dec. 28, 2010). Unlike the 
press or a cable station, there does not need to be a single speaker transmitting 
information over the Internet. 
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nongovernmental actors.292 In the multispeaker environment of 
the Internet, the free flow of ideas cannot be protected if liberty 
interests are evaluated in a two-speaker forum, because there 
are tiers of speakers and expressive interests present293: edge 
users submit and access content; corporate content and 
application providers engineer methods to access their content 
and that of edge users; and ISPs deliver the resources to make 
all the above interactions possible.294 The government, after the 
Comcast decision, is only a limited overseer in this situation.  
Though perhaps an activist-oriented position, this 
multitiered system suggests that rather than using precedent 
based in a bilateral system, we should be evaluating competing 
communicative interests irrespective of the state-like 
characteristics of these intermediary entities.295 Addressing the 
state action doctrine under this method promotes beneficial 
cultural values, granting to legal discourse symbolic 
statements upon which to base decisions of right and wrong, 
and freeing the categorical approach of decisions from what, in 
turn, becomes an arbitrary public/private distinction.296  
2. Standing to Sue and Problems of Pleading 
An Internet subscriber may also face problems bringing 
their claims in federal court due to issues of standing and 
pleading. Unless the recipient of information knows by some 
other means that he or she is expecting data, there is 
insufficient information to proceed with an action on the basis 
that an ISP is limiting or degrading service.297 Without factual 
support, a litigant would have difficulty meeting the 
heightened pleading standards of the federal court system, 
  
 292 See Yemini, supra note 18, at 51.  
 293 Schejter & Yemini, supra note 290, at 162. 
 294 “Mass-media speech implicates a broader range of free speech values that 
include interests of audiences and intermediaries, as well as speakers.” Yoo, supra note 
18, at 701. 
 295 Yemini suggests a normative approach to assessing conflicting rights. 
Yemini, supra note 18, at 54. 
 296 Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural 
Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to “Private” Regulation 1295-96 (Univ. of 
Conn. Sch. of Law Articles and Working Papers, Paper No. 9, 2000), available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/uconn_wps/9. 
 297 Consider Comcast v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010), where Comcast’s 
subscribers would not necessarily be aware of Comcast’s practice without reports from 
“nationwide tests.” See Peter Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 19, 2007, 6:32 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2007/10/19/AR2007101900842.html. 
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which require a statement of the claim that is “plausible on its 
face.”298 Even if the case can survive pleading, a litigant must 
still show a “concrete and particularized injury” that is “not 
conjectural or hypothetical” in order to have standing to sue in 
federal court.299 This is a difficult burden in the context of 
Internet accessibility; any number of errors, circumstances, or 
other factors could contribute to the degradation or blockage of 
service. Then again, injury may be more easily shown in 
challenging an ISP’s tiering access, which today is the more 
widely utilized form of limitation.300 
An end-user cannot, therefore, sue with an adequate 
basis if transparency is not preserved. Transparency, as noted 
by the FCC, “increases the likelihood . . . that the Internet 
community will identify problematic conduct and suggest 
fixes.”301 As suggested below, the FCC must maintain its role in 
issuing orders of transparency if litigants will have an 
opportunity to properly plead their cases and discover the harm 
giving rise to them. 
IV. PROPOSED ACTION 
If courts were to adjudicate a right to access Internet 
content through litigation, issues of state action and standing 
would likely stop the actions in their tracks. Congress must 
legislate outright that unreasonably impeding access to lawful 
Internet content gives rise to a private right of action in federal 
courts.302 Congress should be specific as to what constitutes a per 
se violation, using First Amendment jurisprudence and the 
FCC’s recent Net Neutrality Order as a guide in determining 
which practices should be banned outright.303 But the legislation 
should also give sufficient leeway to courts to adjudicate 
circumstances specific to the technology, conduct, and 
information at issue. Congress must also make explicit in this 
legislation that the courts have jurisdiction to issue a wide array 
  
 298 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.  
 299 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  
 300 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.  
 301 Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,936-37. 
 302  The Senate’s 2007 bill comes close in permitting “any aggrieved person to 
file a complaint with the [FCC].” Internet Freedom Preservation Act, S. 215, 110th 
Cong. § 12(e)(1) (2007). 
 303 See id. at 17,941-51 (prohibiting blocking and unreasonable discrimination).  
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of equitable relief—an end-user litigant is unlikely to incur 
actual money damages. Equitable relief will serve well to take 
the place of the FCC’s power to issue orders. Beyond the federal 
court system, the FCC must maintain its role as a diligent 
overseer of transparency. Transparency will enable end-users to 
make informed, specific, and plausible claims against ISPs.  
A. The Specifics of Legislation 
Congress can certainly outlaw data management 
practices and pricing schemes that infringe on the interests of 
end-users through its power to regulate interstate commerce.304 
Legislating on issues of constitutional right, even without an 
explicit provision in the Constitution allowing for this, is not a 
shaky proposition either.305 The legislation must guide a court 
hearing a network discrimination challenge, instructing the 
judge to weigh the individual’s right to access the information 
sought with the reasonableness of the data management 
practice or the tiering scheme. 
In its Comcast Order the FCC sought to impose a new 
standard for adjudicating network management challenges: 
“[An ISP’s] practice should further a critically important 
interest and be narrowly or carefully tailored to serve that 
interest.”306 The FCC’s proposed standard, however, is too 
stringent to accommodate ISPs’ interest; any standard utilized 
should not sanction ISPs for failing to exercise the least 
restrictive means possible in every instance of managing their 
networks. In fact, the FCC would later scale back its “narrowly 
tailored” standard because it “overly constrain[ed] network 
  
 304 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes”). “Congress has authority to regulate and protect the instrumentalities 
of interstate commerce, and persons or things in interstate commerce.” Gonzales v. 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2005). Packets cross state lines instantaneously and 
continuously through the packet-switching system. See supra notes 27-28 and 
accompanying text.  
 305 In the past, Congress has used its powers to codify Fourth Amendment 
rights that courts declined to incorporate into common law. See Daniel J. Solove, 
Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial 
Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 754-60 (2005) (discussing passage of federal 
statutes concerning electronic surveillance, government access to records, and searches 
involving communicative material).  
 306 Comcast Order, supra note 87, at 13,055-56. 
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engineering decisions”307 and failed to consider that “reasonable 
network management practices may differ across platforms.”308  
To preserve the property and speech interests of ISPs 
and yet still keep users from facing undue discrimination, 
legislation should adopt an intermediate standard of review.309 
That is, network providers must show an important interest in 
utilizing challenged data management practices, and the 
practice should be substantially related to that interest.310 
Applying intermediate scrutiny comports with the conduit 
speech assessed in Turner311 and is consistent with the 
conclusions of the FCC in its recent Net Neutrality Order.312 
What “reasonable” network management is—and conversely, 
what unreasonable discrimination is not—poses a question 
that cannot be addressed at length here. But even where a 
system of interest-balancing is appropriate, bright-line 
categories of conduct are inherently unlawful. The FCC, in its 
rules to preserve the open Internet, has laid out some methods 
that weigh towards unreasonable discrimination on the one 
hand313 and reasonable network management on the other.314 
Congress should look to these definitions and set out conduct 
that is unlawful per se. Consistent with First Amendment 
principles,315 Congress should at the very least contemplate 
prohibiting ISP conduct that impedes access to lawful and 
  
 307 Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,953.  
 308 Id. Wu agrees that the appropriate goal is to “strike a balance” between the 
opposing individual and ISP interests so as to preserve efficiency. Wu, supra note 62, at 165. 
 309 Moran Yemini agrees that a normative (non-evidentiary) weighing of 
interests is the appropriate model of preserving individuals’ Internet free speech 
interests. Yemini, supra note 18, at 36-37. However, Yemini rejects the traditional 
approach advocated here—for governmental “enhancement” of free speech—where such 
a model unduly focuses on potentially irrelevant governmental interests, and because 
governmental enhancement of free speech interests presumes “a right superior to a 
governmental interest.” Id. at 37. What Yemini fails to consider are the Fifth 
Amendment ramifications of mandated neutrality, which put a conduit and an 
individual speaker on equal footing in the Internet forum, thereby warranting a 
presumption of right superior to governmental interest for edge users and ISPs.  
 310 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661-62 (1994) (quoting United 
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).  
 311 In determining the standard of review, the Turner Court concluded 
Congress’s “must-carry” provisions for cable providers fell within the intermediate 
scrutiny of the Court, where the regulation is a “content-neutral restriction[] that 
impose[s] an incidental burden on speech.” Id. at 662.  
 312 See supra notes 307-08 and accompanying text. 
 313 Net Neutrality Order, supra note 17, at 17,946-47 (discussing 
discrimination and its unreasonableness when it is anticompetitive, harmful to end-
users, or impairs free expression). 
 314 Id. at 17,954-56 (discussing reasonable network management practices like 
congestion-management and Internet security).  
 315 See supra Part III.B.1.a.  
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nonharmful content and degrades provision of services that 
compete with services provided by the ISP.  
Congress must also guide courts in considering the 
weight accorded to the information sought by plaintiffs. 
Needless to say, information that would not normally enjoy 
First Amendment protection should not fall within the statute. 
But the Internet is home to many frivolous—and perhaps 
harmful—enterprises that may be protected speech. While 
Internet resources are not as scarce as broadcast radio 
frequencies,316 for example, they are still not unlimited. 
Unimpeded access to pornographic content (though protected 
under normal First Amendment jurisprudence, if not obscene)317 
may therefore be granted at the expense of access to other 
information that has a direct benefit to society.318 The end-user 
is left back at square one if courts consistently uphold these 
access challenges—a degradation of service to access the 
Internet content of one’s choice. Congress should therefore 
provide that impeding access to certain categories of content—
carefully circumscribed in the legislation for being indecent, 
threatening, or harmful—is actionable only if the defendant 
ISP’s access restrictions also sweep up other lawful content 
that Congress does not set out. 
No congressional bill to date has accounted for end-user 
and ISP interests to the extent advocated in this note. Nor has a 
bill constructed a private right of action that stands in federal 
courts. Congress should create that right of action and mandate 
that the following examples of ISP conduct are significant or 
important network management and pricing interests319: 
• Preserving the privacy and security of end-user 
information and hardware; 
• Providing unimpeded access to the content of an end-
user’s choice, including but not limited to network 
management to maintain standard QoS for high-
bandwidth web applications, so long as providing such 
access does not throttle or prioritize one form of lawful 
content over another; 
  
 316 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). 
 317 Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
 318 “With respect to the Internet, intermediaries help protect end-users from 
exposure to spam, pornography, and viruses . . . while helping them sift through the 
ever-growing avalanche of desired content that appears on the Internet every day.” 
Yoo, supra note 18, at 701. 
 319  This list is, in part, derived from the 2007 Senate bill. See Internet 
Freedom Preservation Act, S. 215, 110th Cong. § 12(b) (2007). 
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• Allowing end-users to attach devices and use software 
that limit their own Internet accessibility to the extent 
end-users desire; 
• Complying with other applicable federal or state law. 
 
This list is not exhaustive. To preserve this bill’s application to 
circumstances currently unforeseeable, the judiciary must be 
entitled to consider other important interests identified by ISP 
defendants. But under no circumstances should an ISP’s 
interest in procuring a profit be sufficient, unless the network 
management or pricing scheme at issue only incidentally gains 
a profit in furthering one of the above-stated objectives. 
Finally, Congress should, at the very least, indicate that 
impeding access to any content that is not protected under the 
First Amendment does not give rise to an end-user challenge.  
B. The FCC’s Continued Role in Transparency 
Congress should also grant the FCC the authority to 
serve as an arbiter of transparency in ISP data management. 
In the Comcast proceedings, the FCC issued orders asking for 
more detailed illustrations of network management practices.320 
The FCC should continue to use this power to play network 
management inspector. The FCC has the technical knowledge 
and resources to monitor the transparency of ISPs’ network 
management practices, and they are therefore better equipped 
to determine whether ISPs are being fully forthcoming in 
informing the public. Continued transparency in the market 
will keep information regarding ISPs in the open so litigants 
can file in court with a basis upon which to make allegations.  
* * * 
In conclusion, the reader should note that the model 
proposed here is not one that would replace the regulatory power of 
administrative law. It is rather designed as a countermajoritarian 
check on legislative and administrative solutions that have 
provided insufficient consideration of individual interests in 
Internet-content access. This new cause of action can serve to 
supplement any regulation with individual action—granting an 
avenue of remedy that is based in the conservative and (more) 
stable doctrines upheld by the Constitution. This additional mode 
  
 320 See Comcast Order, supra note 87, at 13,060. 
2011] PROTECTING A RIGHT TO ACCESS INTERNET CONTENT 435 
of remedy will not only put greater pressure on ISPs to preserve 
individual rights, but it can also serve as a barometer of consumer 
welfare in the Internet market. 
CONCLUSION 
The trend of recognizing access to Internet content as a 
right is important if United States citizens want to hold the 
power to access information and use the Internet as a speaking 
platform. The fact that other nations have adopted such a right 
is informative of international sentiment, but does not 
necessarily reflect the reality of American law. Traditional 
constitutional protections of the First Amendment (though not 
readily applicable to the right-to-access issue) evoke a 
possibility that litigation based in constitutional norms may 
serve as a mode of individual remedy, and further, as a form of 
pressure to exert upon Internet service providers. There are 
indeed major hurdles to this form of regulation: the outdated 
and draconian state action doctrine; an individual litigant’s 
difficulty in alleging or proving a plausible scheme to reduce 
accessibility; and the First and Fifth Amendment rights of ISPs 
in protecting their interests as conduits and enterprises of 
speech. The model proposed here allows for litigation on this 
topic and preserves transitory regulatory power held by federal 
courts until a new regime is fashioned. But that power rests on 
legislative action. In the meantime, U.S. citizens are left with 
little recourse or remedy to protect any theoretical right to 
access Internet content. Therefore, the potential for 
disempowerment of the populace remains.  
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